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Abstract
In the U.S., the power industry is a primary energy consumption sector. Accurate
knowledge on production efficiency in the industry has vital welfare implication from
both economic and environmental perspectives. The first two essays investigate the
causal impact of the vertical separation of the electricity transmission sector from the
generation sector on production efficiency. In the first essay, I ask whether the specific
market restructuring is sufficient to enhance how efficiently production is allocated
among producers. Based on a difference-in-difference comparison on cost-sensitivity
of utilization between coal-fired generators in the treatment region (Southwest Power
Pool) and that in a control region, I fail to find any significant private cost savings
by reallocating production across firms. My second essay takes a further step and
looks into one potential explanation of the results: enabled market power under
restructuring. Following a common method to measure competition, I simulate the
prices that would have occurred had the wholesale market been competitive. Then I
compare the simulated prices with the best estimates available for actual wholesale
prices to measure the market price-cost margins. Empirical results demonstrate that
the vertical separation of the electricity transmission sector actually led to an increase
in the markup in the wholesale market, indicating evidence of market power exercised.
In the last essay, we propose to investigate whether there is stickiness in the passthrough from fossil fuel spot prices to the fossil-fuel procurement costs for the U.S.
electric power producers, and if there is, to what extent the sluggishness is, and how
it varies across different types of fossil fuels.
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Chapter 1
Market Restructuring, Vertical
Separation and Regional
Production Efficiency: Evidence
from the U.S. Power Industry
1.1

Introduction

Economists generally believe that promoting competitive markets serves to enhance
efficiency and welfare, evidence of which has been found by a series of empirical
analyses across a wide spectrum of industries.1 In this spirit, one of the most recent
market restructuring transformations in the U.S. occurred in the electricity industry.
Until the mid-1990s, the U.S. power industry was largely comprised of vertically
integrated utilities in the chain of generation, transmission and distribution, operating
as local natural monopolies. Regulated utilities were compensated under the “rate-ofreturn” principle to cover their costs plus a fair return. Agency models indicate that
under the regulation structure, firms would deviate from cost-minimization behavior
1

See Olley and Pakes (1996) on telecommunications, Ng and Seabright (2001) on airlines,
Syverson (2004) on concrete industry, and Davis and Kilian (2011) on natural gas industry.

1

as regulators setting the prices are asymmetrically informed (Laffont and Tirole,
1993). Integrated utilities also have incentives to over-utilize their own facilities and
provide discriminatory transmission service to non-integrated wholesale competitors
to protect their sales for revenue compensation.

Given these concerns, market

restructuring activities have been enacted in several states since the mid-1990s, which
provoked a considerable body of economic studies evaluating the impacts on the
performance of the power industry.2
This study analyzes the welfare implications of one specific aspect of the market
restructuring process in the U.S. power industry. Typically, restructuring may consist
of the following aspects: (1) separating the transmission function from the vertically
integrated natural monopolies, (2) allowing wholesale pricing, (3) divesting generation
assets from retailers, and (4) imposing retailers under competition by allowing
customers to switch their retailers. In order to evaluate the impacts of restructuring
for policy recommendations, researchers must disentangle these channels, which is
generally a difficult task.3

The Southwest Power Pool (SPP) market, however,

provides a venue to separate them because this market only experienced market
restructuring in the transmission component. Taking advantage of the unique market,
I investigate the potential efficiency gains brought about by the vertical separation
of transmission network in the U.S. power industry.
In practice, the vertical separation is achieved by establishing organized competitive wholesale markets, defined as those intermediated by a Regional Transmission
Operator (RTO), which takes over the transmission control from previously integrated
utilities.4 In this way, market participants can have fair access to the electricity
2

See Borenstein et al. (2002), Fabrizio et al. (2007), Zhang (2007), Mansur (2007, 2008), Hortacsu
and Puller (2008), Davis and Wolfram (2012), Craig and Savage (2013), Chan et al. (2013), etc.
3
Previous literature that seeks to disentangle the channels include: Bushnell and Wolfram (2005),
Davis and Wolfram (2012) and Hausman (2014), who all attempt to separate the impact of generation
divestiture on operating efficiency from the introduced pressure of wholesale competition, and also
Mansur (2007), who disentangles and assesses the consequence of vertical separation of retail function
from generation on market power.
4
Different from ownership separation, the firms still maintain the ownership of the transmission
assets. This type of vertical separation is often referred as “legal unbundling”.

2

network such that wholesale competition is fostered.

Seven organized regional

wholesale markets5 have emerged in the Northeast, Midwest and Southwest of
the U.S., the majority of which also underwent restructuring in components other
than transmission, and implemented market-oriented tools designed to efficiently
dispatch producers to further enhance wholesale competition.6 SPP, however, has
long been recognized as the organized electricity wholesale market with the least
radical reform in term of market-oriented designs and protocols. Rather than through
newly-designed market platforms, wholesale transactions in SPP largely depend on
traditional bilateral trading.7 Without advanced designs revealing and collecting
market information, the main role of SPP is balancing demand and supply, and more
relevant to this paper, maintaining non-discriminatory access to the transmission
facilities.
The necessity of separating transmission function from other activities is largely
grounded on the principle that an electricity market functions effectively only under
the condition of non-discriminatory transmission access. Given the network nature
of the power industry, transmission access is an essential input that competing
power producers rely on to schedule and dispatch their generating units. Vertically
integrated power producers who also operate the electricity network may have
incentives to discriminate against non-integrated competing generators. Theoretical
support of such discrimination is documented in previous literature on vertical
integration (Vickers, 1995; Economides, 1998; Beard et al., 2001).

On the one

hand, due to potential asymmetric information from the regulator’s perspective, price
5

The locations of existing RTOs are shown in Figure 1.1.
For instance, a typical example is the centralized dispatch mechanism that ranks the right
to supply based on bidding offers in real-time and/or day-ahead markets. Market designs like this
were employed in the northeastern U.S., such as the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland (PJM)
wholesale electricity market. See more details of market designs adopted in each organized wholesale
market in Table 1.1.
7
Although SPP launched a real-time energy market that employs centralized dispatch in Feb
2007, its function is restricted only to addressing imbalance between scheduled transactions and
actual energy flow. Moreover, the market is voluntary, meaning the market participants can choose
to either self-dispatch or participate fully by making its resources available. Thus, only a small
amount of generation is traded through the market. In 2008, the transaction volume constituted
roughly 8.5% of the total load in the region (2008 State of the Market Report, SPP, Inc.).
6

3

Figure 1.1: Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs) in North America

Table 1.1: Electricity Wholesale Market Designs in the U.S. in 2012
Real-time
Market

With RTO
New England
New York
PJM
CAISO
ERCOT
Midwest
SPP

Day-ahead
Market

Virtual
Bidding

Ancillary
Services

RTO*

Bilateral

RTO*

Bilateral

RTO

RTO

Financial
Transmission
Rights
RTO

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes**

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes†
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Capacity
Markets
Markets
RTO

Associated
Financial
Markets

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Without RTO
Northwest
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Southwest
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Southeast (SERC)
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Source: State of Market Reports, FERC
* means centralized dispatch market operated by the RTO.
** SPP launched the RTO-based centralized market as late as Feb 2007. Yet, only a trivial proportion of load is traded
through the market (8.5% in 2008).

4

Yes
Yes
Yes

regulation constraint on upstream input might not be binding. This leaves room for
a vertically integrated firm to engage in price discrimination on the upstream input
and directly raise non-integrated rivals’ input costs (Vickers, 1995).8 On the other
hand, even if upstream input price regulation is effective, it would in turn create a
perverse incentive for the integrated firm to practice non-price discrimination through
quality degradation of the upstream input (Beard et al., 2001). Such examples were
documented in network industries (i.e., energy, telecommunications, etc.) in EU
(Hoffler and Kranz, 2011).9 Despite the extensive theoretical literature and great
policy relevance, there have been relatively few empirical analyses on the efficiency
impacts of the vertical separation. This study represents an intellectual endeavor to
fill this gap.
In this paper, I look into the impact of the divestiture of transmission control from
vertically integrated utility producers on regional production efficiency. The question
of interest is: can such separation lead to better allocation of production resources
and increase the probability of low-cost generating units being dispatched over highcost ones? If it were the case that vertically integrated utility producers engage
in transmission discrimination and over-utilize their own generating assets, outside
lower-cost options would be potentially underutilized. This would lead to an inefficient
allocation of the regional production resources. With transmission control handed
over to an impartial RTO, the possibility of discriminatory transmission access is
removed. Under enhanced wholesale competition, under-utilized cost-efficient plants
would have incentives to bid more quantities and increase their sale for larger “rateof-return” base. Intuitively, this would re-assign production resources and improve
regional production efficiency.
8
Under the context, “upstream” refers to transmission access. The “downstream” would be
electricity generation.
9
The examples include discriminatory information flow, overly complex contractual requirements,
undue delays in delivery of the service, unreasonably high requirements of bank guarantees, and the
like.

5

However, a series of previous studies have found evidence that restructuring the
electricity market has enabled wholesalers to exercise market power by withholding
generation to drive up higher prices.10 Moreover, Joskow and Tirole (2000) also
provide theoretical support of market power associated with the separation of
transmission operation when a RTO has to allocate the scarce transmission capacity
through a market for access rights. They find that if expensive generators in the
importing regions have market power, their holding transmission rights can enhance
that market power. If it were the case that market power is enhanced after the
restructuring in electricity transmission network, the potential gains in regional crossfirm production efficiency would be undermined. Thus, whether the separation could
improve regional production efficiency remains an empirical question to be answered.
Following Douglas (2006), I measure regional production efficiency through the
sensitivity of unit utilization with respect to average costs. The implicit logic is that
regions where production resources are allocated more efficiently should rely more on
the low-cost generating units, rather than over-utilizing high-cost ones. Accordingly,
the utilization of generators in such an environment should be more responsive to their
own average costs. Under this logic, I employ the difference-in-difference strategy
and compare the average cost sensitivity of unit utilization in SPP with that in a
control region, where no market restructuring activities ever took place. Focusing
on coal-fired capacities only, I utilize an 8-year monthly panel of detailed micro-data
at the generating unit level and choose the establishment of the RTO-monitored
wholesale market in SPP as the treatment event. I argue that conditional on all
observables, the treatment is exogenous to the question of interest. I provide evidence
that prior to the restructuring, cost sensitivity in SPP was not statistically higher than
that in the control region such that SPP did not undergo the restructuring due to
unobserved advantages related to regional production efficiency. Based on relatively
noisy estimates of the coefficient of primary interest, I fail to find evidence that the
10

See Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), Wolfram (1999), Borenstein et al. (2002), Mansur (2007,
2008), and Hortacsu and Puller (2008), etc.

6

restructuring activity in SPP results in increased utilization of low-cost generating
units. The empirical results are also robust to alternative specifications, including
treatment dates, sizes of the event window, and control groups. I conclude that
divesting transmission control from integrated power producers alone is not sufficient
to enhance regional production efficiency.
My study contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, by extending the
analysis to a distinct organized wholesale market, this study adds to the literature by
disentangling and assessing the effect of deregulation on one specific component of the
sector: the electricity transmission network. Direct analysis on the vertical separation
of electricity network and the consequent non-discriminatory transmission access is
difficult since it is usually concurrent with other aspects of market restructuring.
Earlier studies on market restructuring fail to disentangle it from other efficiencyenhancing channels, such as change of revenue rule, privatization of production assets,
and establishment of centralized wholesale market platforms. Identifying the impact
of each efficiency-enhancing channel separately is vital for policy recommendations on
the optimal design of restructuring “packages”. This is even emphasized considering
the fact that the efforts of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to
promote the restructuring of electricity wholesale markets were vigorously challenged
after the market crisis in California in 2000-2001. This study provides credence that
in order to obtain regional production efficiency, restructuring needs to go beyond
merely divesting transmission operation from the integrated utility power producers.
Second, this study also adds fuel to the current policy debates on the costand-benefit comparison between vertical integration and separation of network
infrastructure in the EU energy sectors. Given inquiry on the role of vertically
integrated incumbents in the energy sector, in September 2007, the EU commission
adopted a package of energy proposals, one of which is the separation of transmission
from production and supply in the electricity and gas sector. By evaluating the impact
on the optimal allocation of regional production resources, this study also represents
one of the few empirical studies in the literature of vertical separation.
7

This study relates to a considerable body of literature that test the effect of market
restructuring on the performance of the power industry in the U.S. The majority of
the literature investigates and confirms operating efficiency gains.11 One of the few
studies on regional production efficiency is Douglas (2006), which focuses on market
restructuring in late 1990s in eastern region. My paper builds upon his study in
that, with richer and more recent data, I am able to disentangle restructuring in
the transmission component from other various channels of efficiency improvement.
Another study on regional production efficiency is Mansur and White (2012). It
compares two typical wholesale market mechanisms, decentralized bilateral trading
and centralized auction, and finds empirical evidence that an organization change
from the former to the latter substantially improved the overall market efficiency. In
this paper, however, I investigate an independent change in vertical structure of the
transmission component in the power industry.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides background
information on deregulation in the U.S. power industry, the conditions of regional
wholesale markets in the U.S., the related literature and the treatment and control
regions under the study.

Section 1.3 discusses the hypothesis tested and why

separating transmission network operation from other activities affects regional
production efficiency. Section 1.4 talks about the empirical model specifications
and the identification issues. Section 1.5 describes the data, summary statistics and
comparison between the treatment and control regions. Section 1.6 provides the
estimation results and discussion. Section 1.7 concludes.
11

See Fabrizio et al. (2007), Zhang (2007), Davis and Wolfram (2012), Craig and Savage (2013),
Chan et al. (2013), etc.
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1.2
1.2.1

Industry Background and Related Literature
The Regulation and Deregulation of the U.S. Power
Industry

The U.S. Power industry in the traditional regulated setting is comprised of vertically
integrated natural monopolies in the chain of production, transmission, distribution
and retailing, with exclusive rights of provision within their geographic zones. The
rationale underlying this arrangement is that this industry is characterized by
extremely high fixed costs and low marginal costs. Accordingly, the U.S. government
regulate all stages of the power industry. Within this structure, regulated electricity
utilities are compensated under the cost-of-service principle to cover the costs plus a
“fair” return on investment. In other words, they are guaranteed to have the operating
expenses covered as long as transactions are approved by the state regulators. This
principle exerts few incentives for firms to improve the operating performance, reduce
cost, and search for and purchase lower-cost production sources other than selfgeneration. Adversely, the producers actually have incentives to welcome higher cost,
which is their base of revenue under the rate-of-return principle, in order to cover their
sunk costs. Thus, the ultimate goal of providing electricity of lowest costs possible to
end consumers is compromised.
Aware of the flaw of traditional regulated structure, several states suffering from
high electricity prices enacted restructuring legislation, beginning with California in
1996. Although the institutions and market designs vary dramatically across different
deregulation processes, two common concepts shared among them are: (1) separating
generation and retail function from the natural monopoly functions of transmission
and distribution; (2) introducing competition by establishing wholesale (and retail)
electricity markets. By the end of 2001, 23 states had passed deregulation legislature
or implemented comprehensive regulatory orders on restructuring. Yet, the California
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electricity market crisis in 2000-2001 made policy makers re-evaluate the process, and
consequently after 2001, no restructuring legislation was enacted.
Due to the heterogeneity in the level of restructuring in the industry across
different jurisdictional regions, previous studies measure the event window of market
restructuring in a variety of ways. They include: (a) access to a RTO-based wholesale
electricity market; (b) the holding of a formal state hearing on restructuring; (c)
the passing of state restructuring legislation; (d) the implementation of retail choice
(allowing customers to switch their retailers); (e) the offering of complementary
aspects of restructuring (such as capacity trading, mandatory divestiture of generation
assets, etc.).12 Following Craig and Savage (2013), I choose the establishment of a
particular RTO-based wholesale electricity market as the criterion.
Under an electricity wholesale market, generators have to compete for the rights
to supply. Due to the open access to the bulk enforced by FERC, non-discriminatory
transmission services managed by respective RTOs, and increasingly diversified mix
of participants in the market, traditional utilities have lost their franchised rights
for providing electricity. Under the new competitive environment, lower-cost plants
are more likely to supply the market and earn greater expected profits. In order to
prevent short-term losses and potential market exit, plants have stronger incentive to
reduce operating costs and enhance their production efficiency.
A large body of literature has aimed to test whether restructuring brought about
efficiency gains in the industry, the majority of which pay attention to the effect on the
operating performance of the generating power plants. Focusing on fossil-fueled plants
between 1981 and 1998, Fabrizio et al. (2007) provide evidence that average labor
and non-fuel operating expenses declined by 3-5% at investor-owned plants in states
passing legislation of restructuring, compared to those under traditional regulation
structure. Zhang (2007) studies operating efficiency gains in nuclear plants during
the period of 1992 to 1998, and finds that market restructuring reduces operation
12

See more details in Fabrizio et al. (2007), Zhang (2007), Kwoka (2008), Davis and Wolfram
(2012), Chan et al. (2013) and Craig and Savage (2013).
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costs by 11% and increases utilization rates by 7%. Later studies analyze longer-term
benefits of deregulation and still confirm the cost-savings in operational perspectives.
Davis and Wolfram (2012), using a large data set from 1970 to 2009, provide
evidence that restructuring increases the operating efficiency by 10%, primarily via
a reduction in the duration of reactor outages. They also consider the confounding
effect of associated divestiture and consolidation but conclude that they explain only a
relatively small proportion of the overall increases. Chan et al. (2013) document that
deregulation made coal plants increase thermal efficiency and achieve lower negotiated
fossil-fuel contracts with suppliers.

1.2.2

Establishment of Regional Wholesale Markets

The necessity of regional wholesale markets is largely grounded on the principle
that an electricity market functions effectively only under the condition of nondiscriminatory access to the transmission service. This can be guaranteed by impartial
operators of adequate regional scope, called Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs)
or Independent System Operators (ISOs).
The FERC regulates interstate transmission and wholesale of electricity. The
establishment of regional wholesale markets was provoked by several pivotal FERC
orders after the Congressional Energy Policy Act of 1992 granted FERC the authority
to order utilities to provide transmission services to requesting wholesale generators.
In 1996, FERC issued Orders 888 and 889, requiring non-discriminatory transmission
access provided by the transmission grid owners. Order 2000 promoted the wholesale
market design of ISOs, encouraging all FERC-jurisdictional utilities operating or
owning the transmission grid to hand over the control to RTOs/ISOs in order to
form regional wholesale market. FERC planned to advocate the model to all states.
However, this became politically impossible after the California debacle mentioned
earlier.
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The first group of regional wholesale markets were founded in the states that
passed restructuring legislation in late 1990s. This includes the California (CAISO)
Electricity Market, Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), and the three
markets in the northeast, New York (NY-ISO) Electric Market, New England (ISONE) Electric Market and Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland (PJM) Electric
Market.

Under the restructuring legislation, all of them consist of considerable

number of divested utility generators (that are transferred to another utility) and
non-utility Independent Power Producers (IPPs). Another two organized regional
wholesale markets, Midwest (MISO) Electric Market and Southwest Power Pool
(SPP) Electric Market emerged in 2002 and 2004 respectively. States incorporated by
both regions granted utilities permission to access the organized wholesale markets,
but only a few of the states passed restructuring legislation.13

The majority of

participating utilities are integrated utilities who voluntarily joined the markets.14
This raises a potential self-selection problem which is discussed in later section.
The only three regions without organized wholesale electricity markets are the
Southeastern, Northwestern and Southwestern parts of the U.S (shown in Figure
1.1). The vast majority of the states in the three regions did not pass market
restructuring legislation and depend on integrated utilities to function as the central
dispatchers for their own territories.15 Wholesale trading exists between utilities
through decentralized bilateral markets. Participants trade electricity bilaterally
either directly or through brokers, with the majority of trading taking place in
the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). The main reason these regions stay in the
traditional regulated structure is largely due to relatively low electricity rates, which
made potential gains from restructuring questionable (Joskow, 1997; Bushnell and
Wolfram, 2005; Fabrizio et al., 2007; Fowlie, 2010). Factors that led to relative low
13

All of them are in MISO.
This means that the market footprint could expand and also that members could choose to
withdraw. Yet, SPP has long existed in the form of a power pool and barely experienced membership
changes. MISO is not chosen under the analysis as its footprint changed several times.
15
The only exception is Oregon. Nevada, Montana, Arizona, New Mexico, Arkansas and Virginia
all suspended their restructuring activities.
14
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prices in these regions include: access to cheap hydro, nuclear and coal generation
or fewer long-term fixed-price contracts with costly independent power producers
encouraged by the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Act (Fowlie, 2010).
In addition to unstructured, decentralized bilateral trading markets like those
in the regulated regions, all RTOs have established certain forms of centralized
dispatching wholesale platforms. Market designs and tools adopted by the RTOs
are different, which could potentially influence regional production efficiency in the
respective regions. The three northeastern markets implemented the most complete
set of market-oriented tools, including information-revelation designs which use a
centralized bidding system for both real-time and day-ahead markets and other
ancillary service markets. The main purpose of these designs is to collect and reveal
information on the heterogeneous costs across producers in order to facilitate trading
and thus dispatch production more efficiently. In contrast, wholesale trading in MISO
and SPP occurred through decentralized bilateral systems with much less information
disseminated until the mid-2000s. FERC’s State of Market Report (2004) explicitly
states that wholesale markets in both regions were much more opaque compared to
others. The situation improved after new market designs were implemented. However,
the new market established in SPP in Feb 2007, called “Energy Imbalance Service”
(EIS) market, operates only as a spot market for correcting load imbalance between
current demand and scheduled transactions under longer-term contracts (through
decentralized bilateral trading). According to SPP’s State of the Market Report
(2008), transactions through the centralized market accounted for only 8.5% of the
total load during that year. In contrast, this figure is roughly 60% in the three
northeastern markets (2008 State of Market Report, FERC). Consequently, the effect
of information-revelation mechanism in SPP largely diminishes. The market designs
across the markets are shown in Table 1.1.
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1.2.3

Control and Treatment Regions

In order to investigate whether divestiture of transmission control from integrated
utilities improves regional cross-firm production efficiency, I need a control region for
SPP. The natural choice are regions that did not go through any market restructuring
activities and have significant fossil-fuel fired electricity generating capacity. There
are two regions that meet the requirement: (1) Southeast Electric Reliability Council
(SERC) and (2) mid-eastern part of Western Electricity Coordinating Council
(WECC), including WY, CO, UT and NM. Both regions are a reliability council
in North America Electricity Reliability Corporation (NERC), which serves as the
balance and reliability authority in the North America.
There is evidence that SERC provides a better counterfactual for SPP. First, the
intensity of competition from natural gas capacity faced by the coal-fired units16 in
SERC is closer to that in SPP. The comparison is shown in Figure 1.2. Figure 1.2(a)
shows the share changes of natural gas capacity across time in the 3 regions. As
demonstrated in the figure, the share of natural gas capacity in SERC is constantly
higher than the level in WECC and closer to that in SPP. Moreover, the change of
share in WECC (from almost zero to over 30%) was more dramatic relative to the
change either in SPP or in SERC. Figure 1.2(b) illustrates how the share of coal-fired
generation among all fossil-fuel units17 varies with regional load, which is captured
by the capacity factor of fossil-fuel units. From the figure, we can see that the
pattern of the relationship in SERC relatively resemble that in SPP. In contrast, the
relationship in WECC dramatically differs. WECC obviously relies more on coal-fired
capacity such that coal-fired units face less competition from natural gas fired ones.
Given these reasons, I choose SERC as the preferred candidate for the control region.
However, for robustness check, I also exploit units in WECC as the counterfactuals
and find that the results still hold.
16

As discussed in later section, the paper focuses on coal-fired units only to limit unobserved
heterogeneities.
17
Other than coal units, the rest capacity is almost all natural gas fired.
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(a) Changes in the Share of Natural-gas
Capacity of the Regions

(b) Coal-fired Generation Share among Fossil
Fuel Units across Load Levels in 2004

Figure 1.2: Competition from Natural-gas Capacity for Coal-fired Units in 3 Regions
Note: Graph (a) is based on EIA 860, which provides annual information on generator capacity. As
well as EIA 860, graph (b) exploits hourly data of gross load from EPA Clean Air Market data.
WECC here only includes CO, UT, NM and WY, where most of the fossil-fuel capacity is located.

The basic information of three regions is contained in Table 1.2. One empirical
difficulty is to determine the control and treatment sample since NERC changed its
entity territories in 2005 (shown in Figure 1.3). Notably, SERC expanded its area to
parts of KY, MO and IL after 2004. Since the newly added parts of MO and IL joined
another RTO, MISO (see Figure 1.1), I do not include generating units in these two
areas in the control group. Moreover, I also drop from the control region Dominion
Company (part of VA and NC), which joined PJM in 2005.

1.3

Regional Production Efficiency Hypothesis

Unlike the majority of the literature which focuses on plant-level operating efficiency
gains, I test the following hypothesis:

can production resources be allocated

more efficiently under the restructured environment associated the divestiture of
transmission control from vertically integrated utilities? If so, the social cost of
meeting the economy’s electricity demand can be reduced.

15

(a) Up till 2004

(b) 2005 - 2010

Figure 1.3: Historical NERC Entities

Table 1.2: Regions in Data Sample
Region

Footprint

SPP

KS, OK, NM*, TX*†,
LA*, MO*, and AR*†

SERC

TX*†, LA*, MO*,
MS*, AR*†, TN, AL,
GA, FL*, SC, NC†,
VA*† and KY*
CO, UT, WY, NM*

WECC

Time of Organized
Wholesale Market
Oct 2004

Never

Never

Market
Organization
RTO-monitored decentralized
bilateral trading (Oct 2004 Feb 2007), Centralized Spot
Market available after Feb
2007
Bilateral trading without RTO
monitoring

Changes in
Footprint

Dominion
Company
(Part of VA and NC)
joined PJM in 2005**

Bilateral trading without RTO
monitoring

* means only part of the state is in the footprint.
† means the states passed restructuring legislation. Note AR and VA suspended the deregulation process,
and restructuring was never implemented.
** In regression analysis, I drop the associated plants of Dominion from SERC in the entire data span.
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Market restructuring attempts to overcome the inefficient features of rate-ofreturn revenue principle and integrated structure of utilities. First, the agency model
predicts that under the cost pass-through guaranteed by rate-of-return principle,
regulated utility power producers would deviate from cost-minimizing behavior and
seek to recover their costs to justify their own plant investment.

Prior to the

restructuring, in order to protect and increase the sale basis for revenue compensation,
regulated power producers have incentives to favor their own generating units.
Second, the vertical integration structure of the industry facilitates this motive of
the regulated utility power producers by providing them the chance to gain economic
rents of the transmission facility. Given the network nature of the power industry,
transmission access is an essential input. Competing power producers must depend
on transmission network to schedule and dispatch their generating units in order to
accomplish the sale of electricity. A vertically integrated power producer, who has
financial interest in the generation sector as mentioned above, and also operates the
transmission facility, would have incentives to discriminate against its non-integrated
competitors. The theoretical support of the incentives has been documented by earlier
studies on vertical integration.18
Even though transmission discrimination is prohibited (FERC Order 888 and
889), vertical integrated utilities might still have chance to favor their own generating
units through either price-discrimination or non-price-discrimination. On the one
hand, due to potential asymmetric information from the regulator’s perspective, price
regulation constraint on transmission might not be binding. This leaves room for
price-discrimination, which directly raises non-integrated competitor’s input costs
and thus the wholesale prices they are willing to accept. On the other hand side,
Beard et al. (2001) documents theoretical support that effective regulation on pricediscrimination can create a perverse incentive for the integrated firm to perform
non-price discrimination through quality degradation of the upstream input. Such
“sabotage” form of non-price discrimination was reported in network industries
18

See Vickers (1995), Economides (1998), and Beard et al. (2001), etc.
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(i.e., energy, telecommunications, etc.)

in EU, the examples of which include

discriminatory information flow, overly complex contractual requirements, undue
delays in delivery of the service, unreasonably high requirements of bank guarantees,
and so on (Hoffler and Kranz, 2011). Both means serve to lower production and sale
of the non-integrated competitors.
Since vertically integrated utility power producers tend to over-utilize their
own generating assets through discrimination, this can lead to underutilization
of outside lower-cost options and thus an inefficient allocation of the regional
production resources (i.e., inefficient dispatch algorithm).

However, with the

right of transmission control handed over to an impartial RTO, the possibility
of discriminatory transmission access is removed.

Consequently, under a more

competitive RTO-monitored wholesale market with maintained non-discriminatory
transmission, under-utilized efficient plants would have incentive to bid more
quantities and increase sale through bilateral trading for larger base of rate-ofreturn profits. Thus, the fostered wholesale competition would potentially facilitate
trading, re-assign production resources market-wise and enhance regional production
efficiency.
Still, there are reasons why the efficiency gains mentioned above should be
questioned. One important explanation is that market restructuring has enabled
wholesalers to exercise market power. A large body of literature has documented
evidence of Cournot behavior in restructured electricity wholesale markets (Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999; Wolfram, 1999; Borenstein et al., 2002; Mansur, 2007, 2008;
Hortacsu and Puller, 2008). Market power could be exerted by universally reducing
production or bidding above the marginal curves to force high-cost units to the margin
for the purpose of higher clearing prices. Thus, the production efficiency would be
distorted with potentially more efficient resources of the oligopolies under-utilized.
Meanwhile, some high-cost units would be forced to the margin and over-utilized
than otherwise. This pitfall becomes more salient when local congestion in demand
occurs in the market. Also, with transmission control handed over to the RTO,
18

a mechanism has to be proposed to allocate the scarcity of transmission capacity
in an efficient manner. Joskow and Tirole (2000) proves that market power can
arise under such mechanisms. Specifically, by withholding the transmission access
rights off the market, high-cost generators with market power in the importing region
can enhance their market power and inefficiently restrict import from cheap power
producers. Moreover, the high market concentration in SPP accentuates the concern
of inefficient allocation from this perspective. In 2003, the top ten owners19 provided
over 73% of capacity and 79% of generation in SPP (2004 State of Market Report,
FERC). In sum, the potential issue of market power serves to counteract the gains
in regional production efficiency brought about by the vertical separation of the
electricity network, leaving the question of interest open to empirical analysis.

1.4

Empirical Model and Identification

The current analysis is restricted to coal-fired power generating units. Almost all coalfired generating units employ the steam turbine technology20 and have much smaller
variation in the production efficiency (fuel heat input required per unit of output),
compared to units using natural gas and oil, for which there are several technologies
available. Thus, focusing on coal units has the advantage of limiting confounding
factors across units due to heterogeneity in fuel, technology, operational standard,
etc. However, there is still significant variation in average operating cost among coalfired units. On the one hand, generating units have heterogeneous capital vintages,
and thus different production efficiency; on the other hand, plants also procure coal
at different prices.
19
20

Nine of them were regional utilities, their affiliates or large municipals and cooperatives.
See “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 2000: an Update”, EIA.
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1.4.1

Empirical Model

The empirical model in this paper analyzes how cost sensitivity of unit utilization
changes associated with the vertical separation of electricity network. If units are
dispatched more efficiently, the utilization should be more sensitive to the average
operating cost, meaning ceteris paribus, costlier units are less likely to be dispatched,
compared to the earlier scenario before the change. Although market production is
dispatched based on marginal cost in real-time, this study focuses on a monthly
interval such that average cost is a fairly logical measure for cost-efficiency. This
is especially true since in both the control and treatment regions majority of the
production is realized by intermediate- or long-term bilateral trading.
The treatment date is chosen to be Oct 2004, when SPP was granted by FERC
the status of a RTO. I later vary the treatment date for robustness check. I select Jan
2001 as the start of the data sample to keep a relatively short event window, which can
limit possibly differential pre-existing trends across the treatment and control region.
The end of the data sample is Dec 2008, after which a new NOx permit trading
program start to operate under the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR), complicating
the calculation of emission costs.
I investigate the regional production efficiency hypothesis by applying empirical
models with the following difference-in-difference specification:
U tilization Rateit =β0 + β1 · log(AV Cit ) + β2 · 1{T reat} · log(AV Cit ) + β3 · 1{P ost}·
log(AV Cit ) + β4 · 1{T reat} · 1{P ost} · log(AV Cit ) + α · Xit + δi +
X
ηt · 1[region = j] + it
j=control,treatment

(1.1)
where subscript i indicates a generating unit (i.e., a boiler), t stands for a specific
month out of the sample, 1{T reat} is a region dummy variable indicating whether
a unit is located in SPP, and 1{P ost} is a dummy variable indicating whether the
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observation occurs post the treatment date. Xit stands for a set of control variables.
The dummy variables δi are unit fixed effect. The dummy variables ηt are month-ofsample time effects, which are interacted with the treatment region dummy so as to
allow for the flexibility of possible differential trends across regions.21 Following Davis
and Wolfram (2012) and Hausman (2014), I cluster all standard errors at the plant
level in order to make statistical inference robust to potential serial correlation.22
The coefficient of primary interest is β4 , associated with the interaction between
the log average cost and the treatment-region and post-treatment indicators. It
measures the change in cost sensitivity in the treatment region, relative to the
change in the control region.

I look into it to analyze the impact on regional

production efficiency brought about by vertical separation of the electricity network
and consequent fair transmission access. If the change in market condition leads to
gains in regional production efficiency, the coefficient should be significantly negative
such that the unit utilization becomes more responsive to average cost in SPP,
compared to that in SERC. This means that costlier units are less likely to be
dispatched and that the social production function moves toward the optimal one.
Therefore, the empirical interest is to test the null hypothesis: β4 = 0.
The dependent variable is the monthly utilization rate of a unit. In baseline
models, I use capacity factor to capture this, which is defined as generation as a
percent of the maximum possible output in a month. That is,
U tilization Rateit =

M onthly Generationit
N ameplateit × T otal Hours in M onth t

(1.2)

where nameplate is the maximum possible load a unit can generate within an hour.
Note that the capacity factor can be zero. It can also be larger than 1 as sometimes
units are uprated to produce more generation than the designed capacity. I drop
21

I also check specifications with only month-of-sample time effects, and get robust results.
The importance of taking serial correlation into account is well discussed by Bertrand et al.
(2004), who argue that positive serial correlation in error terms, if not addressed, can lead to overrejection of the null hypothesis.
22
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observations where the gross load is zero. The logic is that if the monthly generation
of a unit is zero, it is most likely that the unit is shut down for necessary maintenance
purposes, rather than not dispatched for economic reasons. This means regional
production efficiency here only refers to the allocation of production for units that
are available.
On the right-hand side, log(AV Cit ) stands for the log of average operating cost of
unit i in month t, which is captured by multiplying the plant-level monthly average of
fuel procurement contract prices (dollars/MMBtu) with production efficiency (heat
rate, i.e., fuel heat input per unit of output) of unit i (MMBtu/MWh). Except for
emission compliance costs, other operation and maintenance costs are omitted. The
implicit assumption is that these average non-fuel costs are the same across coalfired units. If average non-fuel costs experienced a larger increase in SPP relative to
SERC, attributing the operating costs only to fuel costs would lead to over-estimation
of the treatment effect; or it would result in under-estimation otherwise. However,
in the U.S., fuel cost accounts for the vast majority of the operating costs for fossilfuel generators with steam technology,23 which is predominantly used by coal-fired
units.24 Thus, I argue it is reasonable to use average fuel costs as a proxy for the cost
efficiency of generating units.
Moreover, I do control for environmental compliance costs, taking advantage of
emission permit price information for SO2 and NOx . The environmental compliance
cost is the total actual cost burden due to covering emission (if a plant purchased
permits), or the opportunity cost of using the permits (if the plant used free allocation
of permits but could have sold them for earnings).
23

The average environmental

According to the FERC’s Annual Report of Major Electric Utilities, during 2001-2011, fuel
input costs consistently accounted for over 75% of the total operating and maintenance expenses for
the U.S. power plants exploiting fossil steam turbine technology. The proportion increases to 85%
if only production/operating cost is considered.
24
See “The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 2000: an Update”, EIA.
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compliance cost is calculated via the following formula:
X

P ricejt ∗ 1{Emission M arketjit } ∗ Emission Rateji

(1.3)

j

where subscript j stands for SO2 or NOx , t stands for a specific month, P ricejt is the
permit price for pollutant j, 1{Emission M arketjit } is a dummy variable indicating
whether unit i participated in permit trading program for pollutant j in month t,
and Emission Rateji stands for average quantity of pollutant j emitted by unit i per
unit of generation.
I obtain and update the heat and emission rates from year to year by averaging the
hourly statistics for each coal-fired unit in the sample. This allows for the possibility
of changes in operating efficiency in the long run during the sample span. In the short
run, operating efficiency of a generating unit might also vary with utilization levels.
For instance, at high utilization levels, unit might operate more efficiently with lower
heat input required and pollutant emitted for each unit of output, i.e., lower heat and
emission rates. In order to capture this possibility, I also allow the rates for each unit
to differ in the high-demand season (Dec, Jan, Feb, Jun, July, and Aug) and in the
low-demand season (Mar, Apr, May, Sept, Oct, and Nov).25 Evidence of how heat
and emission rates vary under the two seasons is shown in Table 1.3. Based on hourly
operational data for coal-fired units in SPP, SERC and WECC between 2001 and
2008, I analyze how the hourly statistics differ between the high- and low-demand
seasons. As shown in the table, heat and emission rates are significantly lower during
high-demand seasons when the utilization is expected to be generally higher.
The coefficient on the average cost measures the cost sensitivity in the control
region prior to the treatment event. The coefficient on the interaction between
the average cost and the treatment-region dummy measures the deviation of cost
sensitivity in the treatment region from that in the control region before the treatment
25

Since in the electricity sector demand has to be balanced with supply on a minute-to-minute
basis, utilization of generating units is expected to be high at high-demand seasons, and vice versa.
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Table 1.3: Comparison of Heat and Emission Rates
between High/Low-Demand Seasons
1(High-demand Season)
Constant
Number of Obs

Heat Rate
-0.946∗∗∗
(0.237)
11.93∗∗∗
(0.296)
5101

SO2 Rate
-0.467∗
(0.273)
11.41∗∗∗
(0.481)
5099

NOx Rate
-0.195∗∗∗
(0.0595)
4.334∗∗∗
(0.101)
5101

Notes: Heat rate (MMBtu/MWh) is the amount of heat input used per
unit of output. SO2 and NOx rate (lbs/MWh) is the amount of pollutant
emitted per one unit of output. 1(High-demand Season) is a dummy
variable indicating the high-demand season including December, January and
February, June, July, and August. Observation is biannual averages of heat
and emission rates calculated based on hourly operational data for units in
SERC, SPP and WECC from 2001 to 2008. The standard errors are clustered
at the generating unit level, and reported in the parentheses. ***p<0.01, **
p<0.05, and *p <0.1.

event. The coefficient on the interaction between the average cost and post-event
indicator measures the common trend of changes in cost sensitivity for the control
and treatment regions after the treatment event. I also include a set of control
variables. It incorporates unit vintages up to the third polynomial, indicators for
unit participation in the NOx permit trading market26 , and indicators for whether a
unit is equipped with abatement control technologies for SO2 or NOx . I also include
monthly total generation (of all fuel sources) of the state where the unit is located
to control for variation in demand level. This is important since even costly units
would serve more load under high-demand scenarios. Regional load levels are also
implicitly controlled for via the inclusion of the interaction between the month-ofsample indicators and the region dummy. This flexibility also allows for other trends
to vary not only across time but also across the control and treatment regions. The
later is crucial to control for since two regions could have experienced differential
trends, the examples of which include natural-gas capacity add-ons during the data
period (See Figure 1.2).27
26

During the sample period, all coal-fired units had participated in the SO2 permit trading market.
Another way to control for possibly differential trends between the control and treatment region
is further restricting the event window. For instance, most of the increase in natural-gas capacity
occurred before 2003. I also apply this method, the results under which are shown in later section.
27
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I also control for unit fixed effects in the empirical model. I check the plant and
unit fixed effects for robustness in related subset of specifications, which control for
unobserved time-invariant characteristics such as idiosyncratic operation condition
at the unit and/or plant level, or more broadly, heterogeneities of state institutional
policies or economic characteristics that did not change during the data span.

1.4.2

Identification

Several identification assumptions are required for valid estimation based on the
empirical models outlined above.

In this section, I discuss two assumptions

that deserves caution under the current context.

The first assumption is that

the assignment of the treatment is exogenous, that is, SPP did not go through
restructuring in transmission component in response to unobserved, endogenous
factors that affect cost sensitivity. The second assumption relates to the potential
simultaneity issue between unit average variable cost and utilization. In this section,
I discuss why each of these assumptions is a concern and how I address potential
violations in the empirical study.
First, the validity of the estimation of the average treatment effect lies on
the assumption that conditional on all the observables, the treatment selection is
exogenous. The assumption could potentially be violated under the context of the
study. Previous literature on deregulation in the U.S. power industry argue that states
decided not to restructure largely due to relatively low electricity rates,28 so they
seriously questioned the potential gains from deregulation (Joskow, 1997; Bushnell
and Wolfram, 2005; Fabrizio et al., 2007; Fowlie, 2010). Earlier studies argue that this
selection is exogenous to their investigated aspects, primarily operating performance.
SPP has access to cheap coal from the Powder River Basin, while SERC has relatively
28

Factors that led to relative low prices in these states include: access to cheap hydro and coal
generation, limited sunk investments in nuclear power, or fewer long term contracts encouraged by
the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Act with independent power producers whose production costs
were generally higher (Fowlie, 2010).
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large share of hydro and nuclear-power production. Accordingly, both regions consist
of member states without restructuring legislation.
A more relevant issue is whether SPP was established as a RTO-intermediated
wholesale market based on members’ belief that they were more likely to gain benefits
compared to SERC. SPP was first founded when 11 regional power companies joined
to keep an Arkansas aluminum factory powered to meet the demand for the Second
World War. Then it retained as a power-pool organization that maintained electric
reliability and coordination. I argue that the coordination experience and pre-set
organization framework provided lower implementation cost for SPP compared to
SERC to respond to FERC’s request of the handover of transmission facilities to the
control of a RTO. In this sense, the treatment is exogenous relative to the question
of interest.
Yet, question still remains weather SPP went through the restructuring due to
unobserved advantages related to regional production efficiency, such as long history
of coordination as a power pool. If so, the validity of inference on the impact of
regional production efficiency would be biased due to self-selection. To deal with the
problem, I test whether units in SPP have higher cost-sensitivities compared to those
in SERC before the treatment event. It turns out that the responsiveness was not
statistically different between units in the two regions prior to the establishment of
SPP as a RTO, moderating the concern of self-selection. This is also reflected in
regression results in the empirical section.
The second assumption relates to the simultaneity concern between average
variable costs and utilization rates of generating units. While units with low average
cost may have higher utilization rates, altering utilization levels might also affect the
heat and emission rates and thus the average fuel and emission costs. To address
the simultaneity issue, Fabrizio et al. (2007) and Chan et al. (2013) use statelevel demand-side factors to instrument for plant generation to calculate the average
operating cost. Yet, because this paper gains extra data granularity at unit level, these
factors would perform as a rather poor fit as instrument variables. To deal with the
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problem, I calculate the average heat and emission rates based on hourly observation
biannually in high- and low-demand seasons such that the average heat and emission
rates could not be temporarily determined by monthly utilization. Moreover, I also
drop observations with abnormally high heat and emission rates. I argue it is highly
likely that they are the results of low utilization levels.
Moreover, simultaneity is less of an issue in the paper since I focus on utilization
of coal-fired units only. Compared to the natural-gas or petroleum counterparts,
coal units have much higher start-up costs. If the coal-fired units are turned on, the
average cost is relatively constant across utilization levels. The reverse impact of
utilization on production efficiency, and thus on average cost is most likely to occur
at low levels when coal-fired units are cycled on and off, which seldom occurs as they
serve the base load. Thus, I investigate whether coal-fired units in the treatment
and control regions become more likely to be turned on and off after the treatment
event. Based on hourly unit-level load information from EPA Clean Air Market data,
I calculate the standard deviation of hourly generation for all coal-fired units for a
given month, and then average the statistics across both regions in SPP and SERC.
The results are provided in Figure 1.5. As shown in the figure, except for the seasonal
change, the standard deviation of hourly load maintains constant across time, and
the trends of the 2 regions collapse. This provides evidence that coal-fired units in
neither of the regions become more prone to being cycled on and off. Accordingly,
the major simultaneity between utilization and average operating cost in the current
analysis is largely moderated.

1.5
1.5.1

Data
Data Description

The rich data exploited in this study are mainly comprised of monthly information
on the following aspects: operational activities of power generators, power plant
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Figure 1.4: Average S.D. of Hourly Coal-fired Unit Load
Note: The graph is based on hourly operational data from EPA Clean Air Market Data. I calculate
the standard deviations of generation for each unit in the sample and then average across units in
SPP and SERC. The treatment event occurred at 2004.

fuel receipts and generating unit configuration. They are obtained from three major
sources: EPA’s Clean Air Markets data, FERC 423 (and EIA 923) and EIA 860.
For the current study, I select all units with coal as the primary fuel type. I avoid
choosing an event window that is too large. A large event window means other
concurrent trends of related factors are more likely to bias the results. Further,
in 2009, a new NOx cap-and-trade market started to operate under the Clean Air
Interstate Rule (CAIR), along with the previous NOx Budget Trading program. This
makes it complicated to calculate the emission costs. For the above two reasons, I
choose a data sample between 2001 and 2008.
Data on boiler-level29 electricity generation, fuel usage and emissions come from
EPA’s Clean Air Markets Division. Plants participating in the Acid Rain program,
one of whose major target is power plants, must report unit-level data on the above
variables. Moreover, the pollutant data is obtained through a continuous emission
monitoring system with little measurement error. The data source also provides
information on when a specific plant participated in the SO2 and/or NOx permit
29

A boiler is a device that generates steam for power.
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trading program. Based on the information, I calculate the amount of emission that
burdens a plant with permit costs, by interacting the program-participation indicators
with the corresponding SO2 /NOx emission quantity.30 This is vital as there are both
time and spatial variations in unit participation in the two cap-and-trade programs.31
The fuel-cost data comes from FERC 423 and EIA 923.32 The former contains the
data prior to 2008. Both data sets include monthly fossil-fuel receipts for utility power
plants with a total capacity over 50 megawatts. The transaction-level data contains
purchased fossil fuel prices (including transportation costs and taxes), quantity of
fuel delivered, average heat content of the fossil fuel, type of contract, quality of the
fossil fuel (e.g., average sulfur and ash content), etc. Prices are adjusted to real terms
based on the baseline value of Jan 1982 of the seasonally adjusted Producer Price
Index: Intermediate Energy Goods (PPIIEG).33 I calculate the monthly mean of fuel
receipt prices, weighted by the transaction volumes within each plant. Matching
them with boiler-level generation and fuel-consumption data, I compute the monthly
average fuel costs per unit of load. Since the fuel receipt data is at the plant level,
the implicit assumption is that the boilers/generators within the same plant employ
fuel with negligible cost differences for a given month.
The SO2 and NOx permit prices are obtained from BGC Partners,34 which
is a leading global brokerage company with a variety of products under service.
It calculates daily permit prices based on private transactions made through the
30

Different from the SO2 cap-and-trade market, which operates through the entire year, the market
for NOx only operates during the ozone season (May-Sep). Accordingly, I set participation dummy
for NOx permit trading program to be zero during non-ozone seasons even if a unit participated in
the program.
31
For instance, by 2001, the nationwide SO2 permit trading program had brought in almost every
new and existing fossil fuel generating unit in America. In contrast, participants of NOx Budget
Trading Program (NBP) are primarily located in northeastern and southeastern regions. Although
a large proportion of units in SERC region were included in the NBP program since May, 2003, only
1 unit participated in SPP.
32
Fuel cost data for non-utilities is publicly unavailable for privacy purposes, which leads to missing
data if utility generating assets were sold to non-utility firms. However, no divestiture occurred in
either of the regions during the data window (See Cicala, 2015). Also, vast majority of the electricity
is produced by utility plants in both regions.
33
It is available from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED II).
34
I am grateful to Jacob LaRiviere and J. Scott Holladay for sharing the data.
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company. I assume that the data reflects price variations of transactions in the entire
market and the same cost burden of emission for all plants. If there were differential
changes in actual permit prices across the treatment and control regions, the results
would be biased. However, I argue that this assumption is relative reasonable since
arbitrage should eliminate the price difference across regions.
The unit configuration data comes from EIA 860 form, which provides annual
electric generator35 data for all power-generating plants with total capacity over 1
megawatt. The data includes generator-level information on nameplate (maximum
generation possible during for an hour), predominance order of the fuel sources, initial
commercial operation date, retirement date, combustion system technology, etc. I
explore the nameplate and capital vintage information and match them with the
boiler-level monthly operational data. To accurately match across the data sets, I take
advantage of a data set containing the generator-and-boiler association information,
which is analyzed and collected by Shawhan et al. (2014). The data includes all units
that are still operating in 2010. This means my analysis excludes units that retired
before 2010.36

1.5.2

Comparison between the Control and Treatment Regions

Summary statistics for the data are provided in Table 1.4. As shown in the table,
units in SERC on average have older vintage and higher fuel input costs.
I also check the trends across the control and treatment regions to confirm: (1)
whether units in the two regions are comparable in each aspect; (2) if not, whether
the differences are consistent throughout the data window. I first examine the trends
of operational aspects of generating units across the regions: average operating cost
(including fuel input cost only), fuel receipt price, heat rate and capacity factor. The
35

An electric generator is a device that converts mechanical energy to electrical energy.
This makes sense as including eventually retired units in the sample span means changes in the
sample which would affect the average cost sensitivity.
36
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics for Coal-fired Units, 2001-2008
Region
Capacity (MW)

SERC
346.9
(296.8)

SPP
422.1
(298.1)

Generation (1000 MWh)

181.0
(173.7)

215.0
(160.3)

Capacity Factor

0.679
(0.224)

0.727
(0.231)

Avg Fuel Input Costs
(Dollars/MWh)

15.02
(4.529)

10.43
(3.762)

NOx Emission Rate
(Lbs/MWh)

3.954
(1.609)

4.133
(1.905)

SO2 Emission Rate
(Lbs/MWh)

12.88
(6.442)

7.202
(4.614))

Heat Rate (MMBtu/MWh)

10.56
(1.921)

11.41
(1.758)

Avg Fuel Receipt Price
(Dollars/MMBtu)

1.45
(0.34)

0.91
(0.29)

Avg Vintage (At Year 2004)

38.80
(10.73)
15981
211

30.98
(10.17)
4165
50

Number of Observation
Number of Units

Notes: the data frequency is at the monthly level,
except for heat rate and emission rate, which are
recorded hourly. Abnormal observations with extreme
heat rate (above 32), NOX emission rate (above 12) or
SO2 emission rate (above 45) are dropped at the cutoff
of the 99 percentiles. Standard deviations are reported
in the parentheses.
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region-wide yearly averages, weighted by monthly unit load, are shown in Figure
1.4. The treatment and control regions differ in average fuel input costs and coal
receipt prices. But both gaps remain relatively constant throughout the data window.
Average fuel input cost ($/MWh) is the product of fuel receipt price ($/MMBtu)
and heat rate (MMBtu/MWh). The decline in average fuel input costs is due to a
decrease in the fuel price for both regions, as heat rates are time invariant. Moreover,
the average capacity factor is not significantly different between the regions. These
represent evidence that units in SERC present relatively good counterfactuals for
those in SPP.
Second, I investigate trends in fossil-fuel capacity mix in the two regions during
this period. I focus on coal and natural gas units as they account for the vast majority
of the fossil-fuel capacity. The trends are shown in Figure 1.6. The most notable
change is that both regions witnessed a dramatic increase in natural gas capacity,
accompanied by a fall in the share of coal capacity. The change was greater in SERC.
To control for common idiosyncratic shocks in a specific region for a given period
in my empirical analysis, I include an interaction term between the month-of-sample
dummy and the regional dummy.
Third, I check for changes in the transmission system in each region. Better
transmission infrastructure can mitigate regional congestion and theoretically lead to
a more efficient allocation of production resources. Failing to account for different
trends in transmission capacity across regions prior to the event might falsely attribute
the effect of a better transmission system to the treatment effect under the current
analysis.

Exploiting NERC’s Electricity Supply and Demand (ES&D) data set,

I find that both SERC and SPP experienced minimum changes in transmission
infrastructure prior to the event window of year 2004.
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(a) Average Operating Costs

(b) Average Coal Receipt Prices

(c) Average Heat Rates

(d) Average Capacity Factors

Figure 1.5: Comparison of Unit Operational Characteristics between SPP and
SERC
Note: The treatment event occurred at 2004. Graph (a) (c) and (d) are based on unit-level
operational data, while (b) is based on plant-level transaction data. All statistics are weighted
by monthly unit gross load. For each unit, average operating cost is a product of coal receipt price
(dollars/MMBtu) and heat rate (MMBtu/MWh).
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Figure 1.6: Existing Shares of Coal and NG capacity
Note: The treatment event occurred at 2004.

1.6
1.6.1

Empirical Evidence
Main Regression Results

The baseline estimation results are presented in Table 1.5. The outcome variable
is capacity factor of a unit in a given month, that is, generation as a percent of the
designed capacity. The event window is chosen to be Oct 2004, when SPP was granted
by FERC the status of RTO and obtained the operational control of transmission
facilities from vertically integrated utilities.
Model specifications listed in Table 1.5 vary in the way environmental compliance
cost is controlled for.

In model 1 - 3, I do not include in the regression the

environmental compliance cost. In model 1, I control for plant fixed effects. In
model 2, I add unit age to the third polynomial to capture the capital vintage. In
model 3, I account for generating-unit fixed effects while controlling for unit age. In
model 4, I implicitly account for the cost burden of emissions by including indicators
for whether a unit actively participated in an emission market and suffered from
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costs for emitting SO2 or NOx emission,37 and dummy variables for the installation of
abatement devices. In model 5, I control for average emission cost based on equation
(3) by adding it as a separate explanatory variable. The underlying assumption is
that compared to the average fuel input costs, it might be associated with different
cost sensitivity. I also include a set of its interactions with treatment-region and postevent dummies. In model 6, I model average operating costs jointly as the sum of
average fuel and emission costs. Since the data of SO2 permit price is only available
after Oct 2001, I curtail the sample data thereafter for the last two specifications.
In each specification, the coefficients on the log of operating costs (log(AV Cit )), are
all significantly negative at the 1% level. This makes intuitive sense. Both in regions
with organized wholesale markets (treatment group) and in those with separate
integrated utilities as collective dispatchers (control group), production resources
should generally be ranked based on the production cost of generating units, which
is instrumented here by average fuel cost (and environmental compliance costs). The
negative sign indicates costlier units are less likely to be dispatched in both regions.
The coefficient of primary interest is on the interaction of log average operating
costs and the treatment-region and post-event dummies, shown on the fourth row.
We can see that it is not significantly different from zero in any of the specification.
With the magnitude being quite small compared to that of the coefficients on AV C,
the coefficients are very much centered at zero, even though the standard errors are
all relatively noisy (roughly 20% of the coefficient on AV C). This provides strong
evidence that the separation of transmission control is not sufficient to bring about
efficiency gains on the regional production efficiency. In other words, I do not find that
production in SPP shifted from higher- to lower-cost generating units. This implies
that in order to obtain adequate regional production efficiency, market restructuring
needs to go beyond the minimum requirement of vertical separation of transmission
37

SO2 Market operated throughout the year, while NOx Budget Trading Program only operated
between May and September.

35

Table 1.5: Baseline Regressions

AV C
T reat × AV C
P ost × AV C
P ost × T reat
×AV C

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.144∗∗∗

-0.145∗∗∗

-0.136∗∗∗

-0.135∗∗∗

-0.137∗∗∗

(0.0192)
0.0824∗
(0.0434)
0.0251
(0.0210)
0.00335
(0.0315)

(0.0186)
0.0849∗
(0.0432)
0.0279
(0.0198)
0.00165
(0.0315)

(0.0211)
0.0513
(0.0410)
0.0259
(0.0218)
-0.00918
(0.0329)

(0.0205)
0.0503
(0.0408)
0.0244
(0.0216)
-0.0107
(0.0324)

(0.0200)
0.0489
(0.0389)
0.0279
(0.0211)
-0.0119
(0.0316)

-0.125∗∗∗
(0.0202)
0.0418
(0.0431)
0.00933
(0.0217)
0.0212
(0.0315)

emission AV C

0.0136
(0.00881)
-0.0142
(0.0201)
-0.0168∗
(0.00900)
0.0328∗∗
(0.0138)

T reat × emission AV C
P ost × emission AV C
T reat × P ost
×emission AV C
N Ox market
SO2 abatement
N Ox abatement
Log state load
Region-month-year dummies
Plant fixed effect
Unit fixed effect
Unit Vintage
Number of Obs
Adj. R2

0.224∗∗∗
(0.0337)
Yes
Yes
No
No
21543
0.417

0.218∗∗∗
(0.0339)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
21543
0.418

0.226∗∗∗
(0.0338)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
21543
0.107

-0.0360∗∗∗
(0.0119)
-0.00792
(0.0111)
-0.0172
(0.0119)
0.190∗∗∗
(0.0347)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
21543
0.109

-0.0396∗∗∗
(0.0136)
-0.00854
(0.0123)
-0.0193
(0.0158)
0.206∗∗∗
(0.0348)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
19641
0.112

-0.0175
(0.0125)
-0.0109
(0.0111)
-0.0209
(0.0149)
0.216∗∗∗
(0.0350)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
19641
0.111

Notes: Observation is a coal-fired generating unit in a given month. The dependent variable is generation
as a percent of designed capacity. T reat is a region dummy for SPP. P ost is a dummy variable equal to 1
after Oct 2004, and 0 otherwise. In Model 1-4, average environmental compliance cost is omitted when I
calculate the average operating cost. In Model 5, I add into the regression a set of variables associated with
average environmental compliance cost. In the last model, when calculating average operating cost, I combine
average environmental compliance cost and average fuel cost. The average environmental compliance cost is
calculated by multiplying permit prices with emission rates and the operation dummy of the corresponding
emission market, and then summing across the two pollutants. Since the SO2 permit data is only available
after Oct 2001 (when almost all fossil-fuel power plants had participated in the SO2 emission market), I
restrict the data sample in Model 5-6. Unit vintage is controlled for in in Model 2-6 by inclusion of the unit
age to the third polynomial. Following Davis and Wolfram (2012), I cluster all standard errors at the plant
level and report them in the parentheses. The explanation of the variable names are shown in Appendix 2.
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and *p <0.1.
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and reach to aspects such as market-oriented designs for revealing generator supply
curves, change of revenue rules, divestiture of production assets, etc.
The sign of the coefficient on the interaction between AV C and treatment-region
dummy also deserves attention. In all specifications, the coefficients are all not
significantly different from zero, meaning that prior to the treatment event, SPP
did not have significant advantage in regional production efficiency relative to SERC.
This moderates the self-selection concern that SPP set up as a RTO-based market
based on unobserved advantages with regard to regional production efficiency.
I also explore how the treatment effect evolved across time. The concern is that
after the treatment event, there could be a time lag before the production resources
are re-assigned and regional production efficiency improves, or that the treatment
effect might diminish over time. Under either scenario, the treatment effect can be
netted out. I investigate the issue by estimating the following equation, based on
Model 5 in Table 1.5:
U tilization Rateit =

4
X

βj · 1[τi,t = j] · 1{T reat} · log(AV Cit ) + α · Zi,t + εi,t (1.4)

j=1

where τi,t denotes the year relative to the treatment event (e.g., τi,4 denoting 4 years
post the treatment event), Zi,t is the vector of variables shown in Equation (1.4)
except the interactions between the log of average costs and treatment-region and
post-treatment dummies. Thus, βj captures the change in cost sensitivity of unit
utilization for generators in SPP relative to that of the counterparts in SERC across
the years following the treatment event. Figure 1.7 shows the estimated coefficients
and corresponding 95% confidence intervals. We could see that the estimation is still
relatively noisy for all years. Coefficients for the second and third year are trivial,
while those for the first and fourth year are relatively large. There is no discernible
pattern that the treatment impact increases or diminishes across time: the coefficients
are all negative but insignificant such that no significant efficiency gain is found.

37

Figure 1.7: Relative Changes in Cost-sensitivity Across Time in SPP
Notes: the figure plots the coefficients of primary interest, which measure the estimated changes in
cost-sensitivity of unit utilization in SPP relative to those in SERC after the treatment event. Time
is normalized relative to the treatment event.

(a) Utilization Rates as Capacity Factor

(b) Utilization Rates as Percent Operating
Time

Figure 1.8: Histograms of Utilization Rates
Note: in graph (a), utilization rate is capacity factor, which is the monthly generation as a percent of
designed capacity. It could be larger than 1 since units could be up-rated. In graph (b), utilization
rate is percent operating time, which is total operating hours over the total number of hours in the
given month. Observations with zero generation or operating time are dropped.
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1.6.2

Alternative Measure of Unit Utilization

I next explore whether the results are robust to the way how utilization rate is defined.
Rather than basing it on generation and nameplate configuration of a unit, now I
exploit monthly boiler operating time. This represents another measure of regional
production efficiency. The calculation of utilization rate takes the following formula:
U tilizationRateit =

M onthly Operating Hoursit
T otal Hours in M onth t

(1.5)

For the new measure of utilization rate, a significant proportion of the value is 1.
The histograms of unit utilization measured by percent of monthly operating time,
and monthly capacity factor are shown in Figure 1.8. There is an obvious difference
between the distributions of the variables. Most of the time, the coal-fired units are
turned on as they serve the base load. However, this does not mean they are operated
to the full capacity all the time. Monthly observations with zero operating time are
dropped as they are mostly likely to be due to scheduled maintenance. The results
are shown in Table 1.6. The coefficients of primary interest are still not significantly
different from zero in any of the specifications. Yet, the results are still informative.
It means that the results found in the paper should be cautiously interpreted. No
regional production efficiency gain is found with regard to either whether a unit should
be turned on or off line, or under what capacity factor a unit should be dispatched.

1.6.3

Alternative Measure of regional production Efficiency:
Utilization Sensitivity to Relative Cost

So far, I look into the absolute average operating costs as the determinant of unit
utilization. If units only compete with nearby counterparts in the region, another
criterion of how generating units should be dispatched is relative cost efficiency. In
the section, I exploit relative average operating costs as the criterion for the dispatch
algorithm to analyze the impact of vertical separation of transmission in the U.S.
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Table 1.6: Robustness Check: Percent of Operating time as Utilization
Rate
AV C
T reat × AV C
P ost × AV C
P ost × T reat
×AV C

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.114∗∗∗
(0.0154)
0.0478
(0.0298)
0.00973
(0.0144)
0.0128
(0.0243)

-0.114∗∗∗
(0.0153)
0.0478
(0.0296)
0.00842
(0.0144)
0.0127
(0.0241)

-0.102∗∗∗
(0.0181)
0.0180
(0.0309)
0.00157
(0.0164)
0.0162
(0.0243)

-0.101∗∗∗
(0.0176)
0.0176
(0.0306)
0.00241
(0.0162)
0.0139
(0.0241)

-0.0974∗∗∗
(0.0192)
0.0144
(0.0337)
0.00307
(0.0179)
0.0134
(0.0271)

-0.0997∗∗∗
(0.0195)
0.0240
(0.0355)
0.00582
(0.0186)
0.0179
(0.0258)

emission AV C

-0.000593
(0.00711)
0.00303
(0.0144)
-0.00144
(0.00698)
0.00943
(0.0101)

T reat × emission AV C
P ost × emission AV C
P ost × T reat
×emission AV C
N O x mkt
SO 2 abatement
N O x abatement
Log state load
Region-month-year dummies
Plant fixed effect
Unit fixed effect
Unit Vintage
Number of Obs
Adj. R2

0.184∗∗∗
(0.0325)
Yes
Yes
No
No
21546
0.216

0.187∗∗∗
(0.0325)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
21546
0.216

0.195∗∗∗
(0.0325)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
21546
0.090

-0.0140
(0.00977)
-0.0193∗∗∗
(0.00722)
-0.0221∗∗
(0.0106)
0.180∗∗∗
(0.0348)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
21546
0.090

-0.0103
(0.0117)
-0.0203∗∗
(0.00860)
-0.0257∗
(0.0141)
0.191∗∗∗
(0.0360)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
19644
0.092

0.00172
(0.0106)
-0.0234∗∗∗
(0.00819)
-0.0258∗
(0.0139)
0.195∗∗∗
(0.0359)
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
19644
0.091

Notes: Observation is a coal-fired generating unit in a given month. The dependent variable is monthly operating
hours as as percent of total number of hours in that month. T reat is a region dummy for SPP. P ost is a dummy
variable equal to 1 after Oct 2004, and 0 otherwise. In Model 1-4, average environmental compliance cost is omitted
when I calculate the average operating cost. In Model 5, I add into the regression a set of variables associated with
average environmental compliance cost. In the last model, when calculating average operating cost, I combine average
environmental compliance cost and average fuel cost. The average environmental compliance cost is calculated by
multiplying permit prices with emission rates and the operation dummy of the corresponding emission market, and
then summing across the two pollutants. Since the SO2 permit data is only available after Oct 2001 (when almost all
fossil-fuel power plants had participated in the SO2 emission market), I restrict the data sample in Model 5-6. Unit
vintage is controlled for in in Model 2-6 by inclusion of the unit age to the third polynomial. Following Davis and
Wolfram (2012), I cluster all standard errors at the plant level and report them in the parentheses. The explanation
of the variable names are shown in Appendix 2. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and *p <0.1.

Table 1.7:
efficiency

Robustness Check:

Dependent Variable
Relative AV C
T reat × Relative AV C
P ost × Relative AV C
P ost × T reat
×Relative AV C
Region-month-year dummies
Unit fixed effect
Unit Vintage
Robust Heat and Emission Rate
Number of Obs
Adj. R2

Relative Cost-

Capacity Factor

Percent Operating Time

-0.0202∗∗
(0.00796)
-0.00675
(0.0199)
0.00926
(0.00734)
0.000598
(0.0132)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
19787
0.103

-0.0165∗∗
(0.00772)
-0.00962
(0.0173)
0.00768
(0.00669)
0.00110
(0.0116)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
19790
0.087

Notes: Observation is a coal-fired generating unit in a given month. T reat is a
region dummy for SPP. P ost is a dummy variable equal to 1 after Oct, 2004, and 0
otherwise. Relative AV C is the monthly relative average operating cost (fuel and
emission cost combined) which is normalized by the minimal average costs across
units in each related region. Following Davis and Wolfram (2012), I cluster all
standard errors at the plant level and report them in the parentheses. ***p<0.01,
** p<0.05, and *p <0.1.
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power industry. The advantage in this fashion is normalizing not only the variation
of average costs across time but also the gap in average costs between the treatment
and control regions.
Empirically, I sum average fuel and emission costs for each generating unit and
normalize the combined average operating costs by the varying monthly minimum
in each region. This implies the variation in cost efficiency here measures changes
in the extent of how much more costlier the operation of a unit is relative to the
current most cost-efficient one within the region. The results are shown in Table 1.7.
I vary the specifications by the definition of unit utilization. Yet, the empirical results
still provide no significant evidence of improvement in regional production efficiency.
The coefficients of primary interest are both small in magnitude and none of them is
significantly different from zero.

1.6.4

Robustness Check on the Treatment Date

In the baseline models, I choose the treatment date as Oct 2004, when SPP was
granted the status of a FERC-authorized RTO. The argument for the selection is
that it means the proposal of transmission control by SPP was approved by FERC
and SPP officially obtained the control right of the transmission network. Concerns
exist whether this is truly the time when the treatment takes into effect. For instance,
as a power pool, SPP might have already taken efforts to maintain a fair transmission
access in order to obtain the status of a RTO; or there might be a time lag of the
treatment effect on regional production efficiency due to the stickiness under longterm electricity contracts. If these circumstances are true, the current results of no
identified regional production efficiency gains could be the consequence of a false
selection of treatment date.
For these reasons, I perform a falsification test on the validity the choice of
the treatment date.

The magnitude of estimated treatment effect should reach

the maximum at the true treatment date as either falsely assigning the treated
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Figure 1.9: Change Differentials in Cost Sensitivity under Different Chosen
Treatment Dates
Note: The employed empirical model is model 5 in baseline regressions. The control region is SERC.

observations into the untreated group, or assigning the untreated observations into the
treated group would downward bias the estimation results. Accordingly, I randomly
select months within a bandwidth of 1 year around Oct 2004 as the treatment dates
and obtain the estimated coefficients of primary interest associated with each choice
of the treatment date. If there indeed is significant treatment impact and the previous
choice of treatment date is wrong, I should find at least one of the coefficients
estimated to be significantly negative. And the coefficient should reach the lowest
value (since the treatment effect is expected to be negative) at the right treatment
date. The estimated coefficients are shown in Figure 1.9 along with the 95% confidence
intervals. The data window is between Oct 2001 and Dec 2008. The empirical model
applied is the same as Model 5 in Table 1.5. As shown in the figure, the estimated
coefficients are quite invariant across time and none of them is significantly different
from zero. This provides evidence that the result of no identified gains in regional
production efficiency is robust to the selection of treatment date.
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1.6.5

Variations in the Choice of Event Window

In this section, I investigate whether the empirical results found are robust to how
the event window is chosen. First, I examine whether the results still hold if periods
near the treatment event are excluded. Second, I vary the bandwidth of the event
window. Third, I restrict the event window only to weekdays.
The logic of excluding periods shortly prior to the treatment event is that near the
treatment event, market participants might have anticipated the upcoming changes
in market condition and behaved differently. On the other hand, there might be a
time lag before the market participants were able to respond to the market change.
In order to investigate this concern, I drop 6 months before and after Oct 2004 and
estimate the change in cost-sensitivity in SPP relative to that in SERC. The results
are provided in the first and third columns of Table 1.8. The empirical model selected
is still the the preferred one with average environmental cost controlled for separately.
As shown in the table, there is still no evidence that utilization of units in SPP became
more sensitive to average costs relative to that of units in SERC after the separation
of transmission control.
Second, I vary the bandwidth of the event window out of the concern that under
a long event window, the empirical results might be biased by other concurrent
differential trends across the control and treatment regions.

One example of

differential trends is the add-ons of natural gas capacity in the SPP and SERC.
Narrowing the event window could tease out the impacts of trends other than the
separation of electricity network on cost sensitivities. In the second and third columns
of Table 8, I trim down the length of the event window to be 4 years, centered around
Oct 2004. Still, the coefficients of primary interest are not significantly different
from zero. In the third column, I also drop 6 months before and after the treatment
event. Yet, the result of no efficiency gains still holds. Taking advantage of daily
data, I further narrow down the event window. The results are shown in Table
1.9. The length of event window varies from 2 years, 1 year, to 6 months. Again,
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Table 1.8: Variation in the Event Window: Monthly Data
AV C
T reat × AV C
P ost × AV C
P ost × T reat
×AV C
Drop +/- 6 Months Around Treatment Event
Start of Sample
End of Sample
Drop High-NG-price Months
Number of Obs
Adj. R2

(1)
-0.146∗∗∗
(0.0224)
0.0427
(0.0443)
0.0439∗
(0.0235)
-0.0144
(0.0362)
Yes
Oct, 2001
Dec, 2008
No
16730
0.116

(2)
-0.149∗∗∗
(0.0242)
0.0408
(0.0399)
0.0214
(0.0240)
0.0231
(0.0341)
No
Oct, 2002
Oct, 2006
No
13698
0.101

(3)
-0.162∗∗∗
(0.0279)
0.0192
(0.0467)
0.0443
(0.0277)
0.0322
(0.0364)
Yes
Oct, 2002
Oct, 2006
No
10787
0.101

(4)
-0.130∗∗∗
(0.0213)
0.0498
(0.0450)
0.0291
(0.0214)
0.0111
(0.0337)
No
Oct, 2001
Dec, 2008
Yes
14679
0.108

Notes: Observation is a coal-fired generating unit on a given month in SPP and SERC. The treatment date chosen
is Oct 2004. The empirical model chosen is the same as model 5 in the baseline regressions in Table 5, where
environmental compliance cost is separately controlled for. In specification 1 and 3, I dropped 6 months before and
after the treatment date. In model 4, I drop months with high natural gas spot prices (See Figure 11). ***p<0.01,
** p<0.05, and *p <0.1.

the coefficients measuring the relative change in cost-sensitivity in SPP are still not
significantly different from zero.
Third, I restrict the data period to weekdays only. This can limit confounding
factors as a result of potentially different market conditions during weekends, such
as distinct market demand due to different residential consumption preference,
institutional socio-economic situations, etc. It is more likely that during weekdays
when demand is high, SPP and SERC face similar market conditions and thus also
similar requirement of reliability control, level of transmission congestion, schedule
of electricity transactions, etc. The results are shown in the second, fourth and
sixth column in Table 1.9. The results still provide no evidence of gains in regional
production efficiency in SPP.

1.6.6

WECC as the Control Region

I then check whether the results are robust to the selection of the control group. As
discussed in Section 1.2.3, there are reasons why generating units in SERC might be
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Table 1.9: Variation in the Event Window: Daily Data
AV C
T reat × AV C
P ost × AV C
P ost × T reat
×AV C
Start of Sample
End of Sample
Drop Weekends
Number of Obs
Adj. R2

(1)
-0.0969∗∗∗
(0.0328)
-0.00153
(0.0561)
-0.0190
(0.0280)
0.0375
(0.0427)
Oct, 2003
Oct, 2005
No
253910
0.267

(2)
-0.0937∗∗∗
(0.0326)
-0.00192
(0.0557)
-0.0212
(0.0283)
0.0390
(0.0418)
Oct, 2003
Oct, 2005
Yes
217437
0.264

(3)
-0.149∗∗∗
(0.0493)
0.118
(0.0761)
-0.0934∗∗
(0.0396)
0.0500
(0.0650)
April, 2004
April, 2005
No
88443
0.273

(4)
-0.143∗∗∗
(0.0497)
0.118
(0.0761)
-0.0991∗∗
(0.0395)
0.0552
(0.0634)
April, 2004
April, 2005
Yes
75903
0.270

(5)
0.00286
(0.0608)
-0.0129
(0.0677)
-0.108∗∗
(0.0456)
0.0408
(0.0606)
July, 2004
Jan, 2005
No
47952
0.377

(6)
0.0113
(0.0635)
-0.0156
(0.0695)
-0.117∗∗
(0.0465)
0.0527
(0.0602)
July, 2004
Jan, 2005
Yes
41040
0.374

Notes: Observation is a coal-fired generating unit in a given day in SPP and SERC. With Oct 2004 being the
treatment event, the length of the event window varies from 2 years, 1 year to 6 months. The empirical model chosen
is the same as model 5 in the baseline regressions in Table 5, where environmental compliance cost is separately
controlled for. Indicators for emission market participation and abatement device installment are omitted due to
little variation as a result of the restricted event window. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and *p <0.1.

better counterfactuals for those in SPP. Yet, extra caution is still needed to check the
robustness of the current results by exploiting units in WECC as the counterfactuals
instead. I select the following states in WECC where the vast majority of the coal
plants are located: Utah, Colorado, New Mexico and Wyoming.38 Units in Arizona
is excluded as they are more prone to the import need of California.
The empirical model applied is still Model 5 in the baseline specifications, where
average emission input costs are controlled for separately. I also vary the event window
for robustness checks. The empirical results are provided in Table 1.10. As shown
in the table, the signs of the coefficients of primary interest are mixed. But none of
them is significantly different from zero (except for the one in the second specification
with a weakly positive sign). Again, there is no evidence that the cost sensitivity of
units in SPP increases relative to their counterparts in WECC.
38

The states included are also where the vast majority of the natural gas plants are located.
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Table 1.10: Robustness Checks: Coal Units in WECC as the Control Group
AV C
T reat × AV C
P ost × AV C
P ost × T reat
×AV C
Data Frequency
Start of Sample
End of Sample
Drop Weekends
Number of Obs
Adj. R2

(1)
-0.136∗∗∗
(0.0391)
0.0249
(0.0542)
-0.0158
(0.0301)
0.0493
(0.0404)
Monthly
Oct, 2002
Oct, 2006
No
4582
0.088

(2)
-0.123∗∗∗
(0.0428)
-0.0174
(0.0602)
-0.0106
(0.0306)
0.0704∗
(0.0407)
Monthly
Oct, 2002
Oct, 2006
No
3365
0.097

(3)
-0.146∗∗∗
(0.0353)
0.0484
(0.0551)
0.00130
(0.0311)
0.0193
(0.0437)
Daily
Oct, 2003
Oct, 2005
No
105755
0.294

(4)
-0.148∗∗∗
(0.0351)
0.0534
(0.0549)
0.00355
(0.0307)
0.0159
(0.0424)
Daily
Oct, 2003
Oct, 2005
Yes
90557
0.296

(5)
-0.310∗∗∗
(0.0772)
0.276∗∗∗
(0.0960)
-0.00991
(0.0296)
-0.0218
(0.0646)
Daily
April, 2004
April, 2005
No
36977
0.300

(6)
-0.303∗∗∗
(0.0768)
0.274∗∗∗
(0.0955)
-0.0147
(0.0294)
-0.0175
(0.0631)
Daily
April, 2004
April, 2005
Yes
31730
0.302

(7)
-0.103
(0.0773)
0.0932
(0.0836)
0.0117
(0.0355)
-0.0771
(0.0556)
Daily
July, 2004
Jan, 2005
No
20152
0.376

(8)
-0.101
(0.0786)
0.0967
(0.0843)
0.00567
(0.0355)
-0.0699
(0.0541)
Daily
July, 2004
Jan, 2005
Yes
17243
0.378

Notes: Observation is a coal-fired generating unit in a given month/day in SPP and WECC. The dependent
variable is generation as a percent of designed capacity. With Oct 2004 being the treatment event, the length of
the event window varies among specifications. The empirical model chosen is the same as model 5 in the baseline
regressions in Table 5, where environmental compliance cost is separately controlled for. In model 2, I dropped 6
months before and after the treatment event. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and *p <0.1.

1.6.7

Changes in Natural Gas Prices

In this paper, natural gas generating units are excluded from the analysis. The intent
is to limit unobserved heterogeneity across units. However, the potential challenge
associated is failing to directly control for the possible competition between coal and
natural gas capacity. For instance, if natural gas price increased dramatically, which
is what occurred in 2005 and 2008 (shown in Figure 1.10), coal-fired units would
replace the natural gas counterparts such that even the relative costly coal units
would still be able to serve more load. Under the circumstance, failing to control this
fuel displacement would lead to downward biased estimation of the cost sensitivity of
utilization for coal-fired units. Since average coal prices and average fuel input costs
in SPP are lower compared to those in SERC, relative costly coal units in their cohorts
in SPP are more likely to replace natural gas units in the region. So the extent of
downward biased estimation might be even higher in SPP than in SERC. This could
be an alternative explanation of the results identified under previous analysis. Given
this concern, I drop periods (June 2005 to Feb 2006 and the entire year of 2008) with
abnormally high natural gas prices to tease out the impact of the fuel displacement
pattern. I replicate Model 5 in the baseline specifications. The empirical results
are provided in the fourth column in Table 1.8. The results are still robust: the
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Figure 1.10: Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Prices (Monthly Average)
coefficients implying regional production efficiency gains under the treatment effect
are still not significantly different from zero.

1.7

Conclusion

Market restructuring in the U.S. power industry varies dramatically across regions.
Unlike earlier studies, this paper takes advantage of a unique regional wholesale
market in the U.S., the Southwest Power Pool. It experienced restructuring only in the
transmission component of the sector, aimed to remove discriminatory transmission
access. Comparing it with a control region where no restructuring activities ever took
place, I fail to find any significant gains in regional production efficiency brought
by the change. In other words, increased competition introduced by the vertical
separation of transmission network and the consequent non-discriminatory access is
not sufficient to make the region allocate the production resources more efficiently.
An alternative explanation is that the efficiency gains could be offset by the potential
loss as a result of arising market power associated with wholesale competition.
This paper renders useful evidence for policy implications. First of all, my findings
shed light on future market restructuring activities in the power industry. Since the
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wholesale market models have been seriously challenged due to high implementation
costs, this suggests caution in deciding which components are necessary and sufficient
to be included in the restructuring “package”. This paper provides arguments that in
order to reach improvement in regional production efficiency, market restructuring in
the power sector should go beyond the minimum requirement of divesting transmission
control from vertically integrated utilities. Second, my study also adds knowledge to
the recent debate in EU energy sector on the cost-and-benefit analysis in vertical
integration and separation.
Certain caveats require attention. First, although I provide evidence that both
region experienced only minimum increase in transmission infrastructure such that
it does not represent another efficiency channel biasing the empirical results, it is
still possible that the physical transmission constraint and reliability control could
hinder the improvement of regional production efficiency.

It could be the case

that even though non-discriminatory transmission access under the RTO control
facilitates the wholesale competition and provides a chance of cost-saving reallocation
of production resources, the room of improvement is constrained by the physical
capacity of transmission infrastructure. Second, the current study only focuses on
coal-fired units to avoid systematic heterogeneities. A more complicated model should
be proposed in future study to also incorporate natural-gas fired units in the study.
After all, substitution between different fossil fuels is also an important aspect and
channel of regional production efficiency in the industry.
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Chapter 2
Vertical Separation of
Transmission Control and Market
Power in Electricity Markets
2.1

Introduction

Deregulation in the electricity industry has been one of the major market restructuring
transformations in the U.S. over the past two decades. Before deregulation, the U.S.
power industry was comprised of many local natural monopolies that are vertically
integrated from generation, transmission to retail distribution. Deregulation of the
industry was intended to introduce competition to improve production efficiency,
reduce operation cost and eventually lower the price paid by the consumers. This goal
was partially achieved. Efficiency gains identified by the literature include reduction
in production costs (Fabrizio et al., 2007; Craig and Savage, 2013; Chan et al., 2013;
Cicala, 2015), and increase in reliability (Zhang, 2007; Davis and Wolfram, 2012),
etc. However, deregulation in the power industry also resulted in wholesalers exerting
market power to reduce supply and increase prices.1 On one hand, production cost
1

See Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), Wolfram (1999), Borenstein et al. (2002), Mansur (2007,
2008), and Hortacsu and Puller (2008).
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is reduced by increased production efficiency; on the other hand, the wholesale price
was driven up by market power. A general concern of the literature is to determine
which of the two forces dominates in term of the welfare implication.
This study pursues this question by looking into one specific aspect of the market
restructuring process in the U.S. power industry. Typically, restructuring in the
electricity industry may consist of a combination of: (1) allowing a third party
to operate transmission lines rather than a vertically integrated natural monopoly,
(2) allowing competitive bidding to drive wholesale pricing, (3) divesting generation
capacity from retailers, and (4) imposing retail competition by allowing customers to
switch between retailers. In order to evaluate the impacts of restructuring for policy
recommendations, researchers must disentangle these channels, which is generally a
difficult task.2
The transmission aspect of deregulation is overlooked by previous literature. The
rationale of the divestiture of transmission control is to prevent the discriminatory
use of the grid. Given the network nature of the power industry, transmission access
is an essential input that competing power producers rely on to schedule and dispatch
their generating units. A vertically integrated firm who operates both power plants
and transmission facilities would have the incentive to discriminate against generators
of their non-integrated competitors when providing the transmission services.3 If this
is true, divestiture of transmission control would enhance competition by removing
the possibility of such discrimination, incentivize previously under-utilized low-cost
generators to produce more and thus lead to more efficient allocation of regional
production resources. Due to the specific deregulation process, the Southwest Power
Pool (SPP) electricity market provides a venue to separately identify the effect
2

Previous literature that seeks to disentangle the channels include: Bushnell and Wolfram (2005),
Davis and Wolfram (2012) and Hausman (2014), who all attempt to separate the impact of generation
divestiture on operating efficiency from the introduced pressure of wholesale competition, and also
Mansur (2007), who disentangles and assesses the consequence of vertical separation of retail function
from generation on market power.
3
Theoretical support of such discrimination is documented in previous literature on vertical
integration (Vickers, 1995; Economides, 1998; Beard et al., 2001).
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of separating the transmission function from other activities. However, previous
literature fails to find that the vertical separation of transmission network is sufficient
to lead to better allocation of regional production resources (Chu, 2015).
This paper takes a further step to investigate one possible explanation of no
identified gains in the cross-firm production efficiency. Associated with the divestiture
of transmission control, an oligopolistic competition environment is introduced, where
the production decision of one firm exerts more impacts on others. As indicated by
a simple Cournot model, under such a scenario, firms have the incentive to drive up
the wholesale prices by withholding capacity to force more expensive production to
be on the margin; less expensive production owned by firms with market power is
substituted such that production on a marketwide basis would be less efficient. The
two forces could potentially offset each other, which may explain why no identified
efficiency gain is found in Chu (2015). In the current study, I ask whether the specific
restructuring in transmission can also lead to market failures by allowing wholesalers
to set prices.
I also examine different incentives across firms to exercise market power through
strategic withholding of generation capacity. In the SPP electricity market, firms
remain vertically integrated such that they are not only power producers who sell in
the wholesale market, but also retailers who are required to buy in the market to meet
the demand in their service areas when necessary. Only net sellers have incentives
to withhold generation in return for higher wholesale prices (Mansur, 2007). Due to
reliability concerns, supply has always to be balanced with demand on a real-time
basis in the power industry, and utility firms are mandated to provide power at any
wholesale costs. Moreover, in contrast to wholesale prices that vary hour-to-hour, the
retail prices paid by the consumers are frozen in the short run under the regulation in
the power industry. Conversely, an integrated firm with a net buying position have no
incentives to drive up wholesale prices since it faces a constant marginal revenue (i.e.,
the constant retail price). Withholding generation only serves to increase wholesale
costs and thus decreases profits.
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I follow a standard approach of measuring competition to market power in the SPP
wholesale electricity market (Wolfram, 1999; Borenstein et al., 2002; Mansur, 2007).
Specifically, I simulate the prices that would have occurred, had the wholesale market
been perfectly competitive.4 To do this, I take advantage of detailed information
on operational and technological characteristics of generating units in the SPP
market, and construct market marginal cost curves which indicate regional aggregate
productions based on the least costly technology.

By comparing the simulated

competitive benchmark prices with the best estimates available for actual wholesale
prices, I compute wholesale market price-cost margins, a standard measure of market
power in the electricity industry.
I compare the price-cost margins in the wholesale market before and after
restructuring occurred in the SPP market.

In October 2004, SPP was granted

by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the status of a Regional Transmission
Operator (RTO), which took over the transmission control from previously vertically
integrated utility firms. I focus on high-demand summer months in 2003 and 2005
as the sample period.5 This is out of the concern that during summer time units are
typically not scheduled to be off-line for maintenance and firms are the mostly likely
to exercise market power given the high demand (Borenstein et al., 2002; Mansur,
2007).6 Based on the empirical results, I find that the price-cost margin increased by
6% to 10% after the divestiture of transmission control. I estimate the added costs
of procuring electricity due to enhanced market power to be as large as $ 240,000 per
hour or approximately 8% of the hourly average in the highest demand hours.
In the second part of the empirical analysis, I test whether firms’ behaviors in
strategic withholding of generation capacity were consistent with their incentives
4
Note that in the simulation I follow a common method in the literature that ignores transmission
congestion and production constraints (such as start-up costs). I am referring the prices as
“competitive benchmark” without considering such practical realities.
5
In 2004, significant proportion of data of key variables are missing, so I exploit summer 2003 to
make the comparison.
6
When generation and transmission capacity starts to bind during high-demand hours, residual
demand of a single firm becomes inelastic such that they are more likely to exercise market power.
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discussed above. Based on annual total sales/purchases data, I identify three firms
with net selling positions in the SPP market and test whether they reduced generation
relative to other firms after the restructuring. I compare the generation capacity
utilization between the net sellers and net buyers in the data sample periods exploited
earlier. The model specifications control for demand and supply shocks by including
simulated unit production decisions under the competitive benchmark and a large
number of fixed effects. I find evidence that firms with a net selling position reduced
capacity utilization by approximately 3 percentage points relative to others.
My study contributes to the literature in several aspects. First, by extending the
analysis to a distinct organized wholesale market, this study adds to the literature by
disentangling and assessing the effect of the vertical separation of electricity network.
Direct analysis is difficult since it is usually concurrent with other aspects of market
restructuring. Earlier studies on market restructuring fail to disentangle it from other
efficiency-enhancing channels.7 Identifying the impact of each efficiency-enhancing
channel separately is vital for policy recommendations on the optimal design of
restructuring “packages”. This is even highlighted considering the fact that the efforts
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to promote the restructuring
of electricity wholesale markets were vigorously challenged after the market crisis in
California during 2000-2001. This study demonstrates that market power can arise
even under the divestiture of transmission operation from the vertically integrated
utility firms. This underscores the importance of the monitoring and mitigation of
market power when policy makers think about market restructuring in the power
industry.
Second, this study also informs the current policy debate on the cost-and-benefit
comparison between vertical integration and separation of network infrastructure in
the EU energy sectors. Given inquiry on the role of vertically integrated incumbents
in the energy sectors, in September 2007, the EU commission adopted a package of
7

For instance, the change of revenue rule, privatization of production assets, and establishment
of centralized wholesale market platforms, etc.
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energy proposals, one of which is the separation of transmission from production and
supply in the electricity and gas sectors. By evaluating the impact on firms’ incentives
to exercise market power, this study represents one of the few empirical studies in
the literature of vertical separation.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides background
information on deregulation in the U.S. power industry and divestiture of transmission
control, and discusses the incentives of firms in the SPP market to engage in
generation-withholding behaviors. Section 2.3 talks about the method of simulating
the competitive-benchmark prices and analyzes the change of the market price-cost
margins before and after the restructuring in the SPP market. Section 2.4 empirically
tests how firms with different net positions in the wholesale market behave differently
in term of capacity-withholding. Section 2.5 concludes.

2.2
2.2.1

Industrial Background and Firms’ Incentives
Deregulation of the U.S. Power Industry

The U.S. Power industry in the traditional regulated setting is comprised of vertically
integrated natural monopolies in the chain of production, transmission, distribution
and retailing, with exclusive rights of provision within their geographic zones. The
rationale underlying this arrangement is that this industry is characterized by
extremely high fixed costs and low marginal costs. Accordingly, the U.S. government
regulates all stages of the power industry. Within this structure, regulated electricity
utilities are compensated under the cost-of-service principle to cover the costs plus a
“fair” return on investment. In other words, they are guaranteed to have the operating
expenses covered as long as transactions are approved by the state regulators. This
principle exerts few incentives for firms to improve the operating performance, reduce
cost, and search for and purchase lower-cost production sources other than selfgeneration. Adversely, the producers have possible incentives to welcome higher cost,
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which is their base of revenue under the rate-of-return principle, in order to cover their
sunk costs. Thus, the ultimate goal of providing electricity of lowest costs possible to
end consumers is possibly compromised.
Aware of the flaws of traditional regulated structure, several states suffering from
high electricity prices enacted restructuring legislation, beginning with California in
1996. The intent of deregulation is to bring down production costs and eventually
electricity prices for consumers by breaking down previous market structure and
introducing competition. Typically, restructuring can consist of the following aspects:
(1) separating the transmission function from the vertically integrated natural
monopolies, (2) allowing flexible wholesale pricing, (3) divesting generation assets
from retailers, and (4) imposing retailers under competition by allowing customers
to switch their retailers. In order to evaluate the impacts of restructuring for policy
recommendations, researchers must disentangle these channels, which is generally a
difficult task. By the end of 2001, 23 states had passed deregulation legislature or
implemented comprehensive regulatory orders on restructuring. A series of previous
studies have documented evidence of operating efficiency gains brought about by the
deregulation, such as reduction in production costs, enhanced reliability, etc.8
Unfortunately, deregulation goals have not always been realized. A series of
previous studies have found evidence that restructuring the electricity market has
enabled wholesalers to exercise market power.9

A well-known example is the

California electricity market “crisis” during 2000-2001, which made policy makers reevaluate the deregulation proposals in the power industry. Consequently after 2001,
no restructuring legislation has been enacted. With enhanced wholesale competition,
essentially a bidding structure is introduced under an oligopolistic competition setting
such that power producers have incentives to withhold generation to drive up the
wholesale prices. This is in line with a simple Cournot model. Notably, Mansur (2007)
8
See Fabrizio et al. (2007), Zhang (2007), Davis and Wolfram (2012), Craig and Savage (2013),
Chan et al. (2013), Cicala (2015), etc.
9
See Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), Wolfram (1999), Borenstein et al. (2002), Joskow and Kahn
(2002), Mansur (2007, 2008), and Hortacsu and Puller (2008), etc.
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has provided both theoretical and empirical evidence that the vertical integration of
generation and retail serves to mitigate the problem of market power. If generation
and retail are still integrated, only the wholesalers who are net sellers have incentives
to withhold generation to seek abnormal markup. In the SPP, no generating assets
were divested such that the logic of firms’ incentives applies under the current study.

2.2.2

Vertical Separation of Transmission Control and Market Conditions in the SPP

In practice, the vertical separation of transmission control is achieved by establishing
a Regional Transmission Operator (RTO) or Independent System Operator (ISO),
which takes over the transmission control from previously vertically integrated
utilities. Different from ownership separation, the firms still maintain the ownership
of the transmission assets. This type of vertical separation is often referred to as “legal
unbundling”. In this way, market participants can have fair access to the electricity
network, potentially fostering wholesale competition.
Seven RTOs/ISOs have emerged in the Northeast, Midwest and Southwest of the
U.S.. The majority of these regions implemented policies that required divesting
generation and supply function from retailing and established market-oriented tools
designed to efficiently dispatch producers to further enhance wholesale competition.
For instance, a typical example is the centralized dispatch mechanism that ranks the
right to supply based on bidding offers in real-time and/or day-ahead markets.10 Some
of them even introduced retail competition and allowed consumers a choice between
retailers. The SPP market, however, is distinct and only experienced restructuring in
the form of divestiture of transmission control during the data period under analysis.
A notable step of the restructuring of the SPP market occurred in October 2004, when
SPP was granted the status of a RTO by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
10

Market designs like this were employed in the northeastern U.S., such as the Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Maryland (PJM) wholesale electricity market.
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Even though transmission control rights were divested, all utilities in the SPP are
still vertically integrated, functioning not only as power producers but also retailers.
This means they may not only sell but also buy electricity in the wholesale market.
Due to reliability concerns, power industry regulation requires the supply to be always
balanced with the demand on a minute-to-minute basis. Utility firms are mandated
to provide power to their customers at any wholesale costs. Sometimes, firms might
need to purchase electricity in the wholesale market to meet the demand in their
service areas. In other cases, firms may be able to sell additional power to others
after meeting obligations to their customers.
Table 2.1 shows the generation capacity of eight major utilities in the SPP market,
categorized by primary fuel types, in 2003 and 2005, which is the sample period under
analysis.11 The SPP consisted of eight major utilities and had a generation capacity
of approximately 56,000 megawatts (MW) in 2003. From the table, we can see that
coal and natural-gas capacities account for the vast majority (93%) of the total in
the SPP. Due to low marginal costs of operation and the production constraints of
not being quickly ramped up and down, coal generating units provide the baseload
generation during most of the hours in the SPP market. In contrast, natural-gas
units, which are more flexible yet more expensive, represent the peak capacities that
only operate during a few hours a day, mostly when the demand is high. Another
thing deserving notice is that the total generation capacity and the shares of each
primary fuel category stayed relatively stable during the sample period.

2.2.3

Incentives of the Net Wholesale Sellers

In this section, I explain the incentives of firms who are net sellers in the wholesale
electricity market to engage in strategic withholding of generation capacity. This has
already been discussed in detail by Mansur (2007).
11

The reason why year 2004 is not included is discussed in later section.
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Table 2.1: Generation Capacity by Firm and Fuel Type in 2003
and 2005
Firm
American Electric Power West
Aquila, Inc
Cleco Power
Empire District Electricity
Kansas City Power and Light
Oklahoma Gas and Electricity
Southwestern Public Service Co.
Westar Energy
Others
Total
Market Share

Year
Coal
3899
614
1279
319
3462
2854
2253
2958
3676
21314
38%

2003
NG
4782
880
3066
1108
932
4050
2229
1931
11592
30570
55%

Nuclear
1236
1236
3%

Hydro
16
2273
2289
5%

Wind
1
372
373
1%

Total
8681
1494
4345
1443
4394
6904
4482
4890
19149
55788
100%

Firm
American Electric Power West
Aquila, Inc
Cleco Power
Empire District Electricity
Kansas City Power and Light
Oklahoma Gas and Electricity
Southwestern Public Service Co.
Westar Energy
Others
Total
Market Share

Year
Coal
3899
614
1279
319
3462
2854
2216
2958
3662
21263
37%

2005
NG
4782
880
3227
1114
932
4050
2229
1920
12990
32124
56%

Nuclear
1236
1236
2%

Hydro
16
2273
2289
4%

Wind
1
372
373
1%

Total
8681
1494
4506
1449
4394
6904
4445
4878
20533
57285
100%

Note: capacity (in megawatts, MW) is the designed maximum of generation
a unit can produce during an hour. The capacity data is available at the
generator level in the EIA 860 form. The data form also provides information
on the primary fuel type used in each generator. The generators are aggregated
into the firm level based on ownership information in eGrid data (2004).
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To understand the issue, one must begin by recognizing that the retail prices
paid by consumers are fixed for utilities in the short run such that short-run price
elasticity of demand is virtually zero. Also, utilities are mandated to provide power
at any wholesale costs to meet demand in their service areas. If a firm is a net buyer,
intuitively, it have no incentive to drive up high wholesale prices since it faces a fixed
marginal revenue, which is the constant retail price. Withholding generation to drive
up wholesale prices would only serve to increase wholesale costs and thus decrease
profits.
I follow Mansur (2007) and set up the simple theoretical model to explain the
question. Based on the assumption that firms are quantity-setting, the objective
function for a firm i, vertically integrated in retail and generation, would be
M ax Pi (qi ) · (qi − qid ) + rid · qid − Ci (qi )
qi

(2.1)

where Pi (qi ) is the inverse residual demand function firm i faces in the wholesale
market; qi is the production of firm i; rid and qid are the retail price and quantity of
demand faced by firm i in its service area; Ci (qi ) is total production costs. Solving
for the first order condition and assuming an interior solution, we have:
Pi − Ci0 = −Pi0 · (qi − qid )

(2.2)

Given the condition, firms have incentives to drive up wholesale prices only if they
are net sellers, that is, qi > qid .
Based on State of Market Reports of the SPP market, I identify net sellers in
the SPP wholesale electricity market through annual total sale/purchase data for the
major utility firms. The statistics for year 2004 is shown in Table 2.2. There are
three firms with a net selling position in the SPP electricity market: Southwestern
Public Service corporation, Westar Energy and Kansas City Power and Light, whose
geographic locations are shown in Figure 2.1. The three major utility firms account
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Figure 2.1: Location of the Firms in the SPP Market
Source: 2004 SPP State of Market Report. The map shows the power control areas in the SPP. The
areas of the 3 firms with a net position of selling are marked.

for approximately 24.7% of the total generating capacity in the market (shown in
Table 2.1). Moreover, the net positions of all the utility firms in the SPP market
maintained the same through my data sample period (2003-2005). The only exception
is American Electric Power West Corporation, which had approximately balanced sale
and purchase (a net sale of 3% of the total sale) in 2003 before it became a significant
net purchaser in 2004 and 2005. Given the negligible share, I argue that it did not
have incentives to excise market power throughout the data span.
Based on net sellers’ incentives to withhold generation to drive up wholesale prices,
I argue they have the potential to exercise market power under a more competitive
environment due to the specific restructuring under current analysis. In section 2.3,
I test the hypothesis that the market power is enhanced after the divestiture of
transmission control, using price-cost markups. In section 2.4, I characterize two
groups of firms (net sellers and net buyers) with distinct incentives to engage in anticompetitive behaviors and compare the generation-withholding behaviors between the
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Table 2.2: Sales and Purchases by Major Utilities: Year 2004
Utility
American Electric Power West
Cleco Power
Southwestern Public Service Co.
Aquila, Inc.
Oklahoma Gas and Electricity
Empire District Electricity
Westar Energy
Kansas City Power and Light
Total

Sales (GWh)
6452
1258
10306
1245
1400
533
8658
6602
36612

Purchases (GWh)
8531
5801
5701
5268
4231
1719
1454
850
34951

Net Sales (GWh)
-1989
-4543
4665
-4023
-2830
-1186
7204
5752
1661

Percent Net Sale
-34%
-78%
45%
-76%
-67%
-69%
83%
87%
4.5%

Notes: the statistics are available from the SPP 2005 State of Market Report, based on FERC Form 1 data.
Percent net sale is net sale as a percent of total sales if a firm is a net seller, or net sale as a percent of total
purchase if a firm is a net buyer.

two groups before and after the restructuring. This provides a venue to analyze the
underlying mechanism of how market power was exercised, implied by the theoretical
intuition under the current market condition in the SPP market.

2.3
2.3.1

Measuring Market Power
General Approach

In this section, I discuss how I measure and detect market power in the SPP
electricity market, associated with the divestiture of transmission control. I follow
the general literature of evaluating market power in electricity industry and use the
criteria of the market-level price-cost margin. Another criterion commonly used in
the industrial organization literature is an indicator of horizontal concentration, for
instance, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. However, such measures actually present
poor indicators of the existence of market power in the power industry. A utility firm
with a small market share could still exercise market power as a result of the following
characteristics of the industry: highly variable price-inelastic demand, significant
short-run capacity constraint and extremely costly storage (Borenstein et al., 2002).
The perfectly inelastic demand implied by the regulation of fixed retail electricity
prices in the short run simplifies the calculation of price-cost margins in power
industry. Distinguished from estimating price-cost margins in other sectors in recent
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industrial organization literature, no assumptions and estimates are needed on the
demand side under the analysis of the power industry. Instead, estimating the pricecost margins centers on analysis on the supply side and specifically on the calculation
of the marginal costs in order to compute the competitive-benchmark prices.
I measure the market-level price-cost margins in the SPP market based on a
method commonly used in the literature to measure competition.12 The method was
developed by Wolfram (1999) and Borenstein et al. (2002), who analyze the market
power issues associated with deregulation in England-Wales market and California
market separately.

Generally, the method requires constructing a competitive

counterfactual under which each firm behaves as a price-taker such that they would
produce and sell power from a given generator so long as the wholesale price is larger
than the marginal production cost. Specifically, they calculate the marginal costs
of each generating unit in the market to construct the market marginal cost curves,
namely, the competitive supply curves, which indicate market aggregate production
exploiting the least costly technology. Then based on the counterfactual supply curves
and information on electricity demand, they calculate the prices that would have
occurred had the wholesale market been competitive. That is, the competitive price
equals the marginal cost of additional unit of electricity generated, given that the least
costly technologies have already been exploited to meet the demand. Finally, they
compare the simulated prices with the actual prices to compute the market price-cost
margins and investigate the issue of market power. I apply this empirical approach
in the SPP market in this paper.
Figure 2.2 provides an illustration of how the competitive-benchmark price is
determined based on the common technique.

It depends on the actual supply

curve, the competitive supply curve, and the demand curve. It is assumed that
the actual supply curve is above the competitive supply curve. Given that demand is
perfectly inelastic in the power industry, if we assume away inter-market electricity
exchanges, the competitive-benchmark price would simply be the marginal cost
12

See Wolfram (1999), Borenstein et al. (2002), Joskow and Kahn (2002), Mansur (2007), etc.
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Figure 2.2: Determining the Competitive-benchmark Price
indicated by the constructed competitive supply curve at the observed demand.
Under the circumstance, the difference between actual wholesale price and simulated
counterfactual price is demonstrated by the difference between point A and C at the
observed quantity demanded.
In contrast, if exchanges between the SPP market and outside regions are taken
into account, then we have a negatively-sloped residual demand curve, which means
the market demand in the SPP market minus the supply function of imports. The
logic of the negative slope of the residual demand curve is that the higher the market
price is in the SPP market, the more electricity is imported, and thus less of the
demand is met by firms within the SPP market. Accordingly, instead of finding the
competitive price at point C, we should move along the residual demand curve and
find its intersection with the competitive supply curve at B. As the price falls to
competitive equilibrium, net import decreases (or net export increases) and more of
the quantity demanded must be met by firms in the SPP market. This means more
expensive units would be dispatched at the margin in a competitive market, leading
to an increase in the competitive-benchmark price (indicated by point B) compared
to the counterfactual under the calculation of which exchanges with outside market
are assumed away. Thus, failure to account for electricity exchanges would understate
the competitive prices and thus overstate the price-cost margins.
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To address this issue, assuming that firms in outside markets behave as price
takers, previous analyses either directly aggregate confidential import bid curves
(Borenstein et al., 2002) or indirectly estimate the net import/export supply functions
(Mansur, 2007) given information on exchange data. Unfortunately, I do not observe
electricity exchange data between the SPP market and outside markets. But different
from the electricity markets analyzed by earlier studies, the SPP market has rich lowcost coal and nuclear capacities, and engages in relatively limited power exchange
with other markets. This is demonstrated in Figure 2.3, which shows the annual
net power flows across regions in North America in 2010, representing the general
power exchange pattern between regions. In Figure 2.3, the SPP electricity market
corresponds to the Central region. From the figure, we can see that the net import
in the northern part of the SPP market roughly offset the net export in the southern
part. Plus, each of them merely account for approximately 2.5% of the net instate generation (257 million megawatthours).

In contrast, two markets under

previous analysis, the California market and the PJM market (corresponding to MidAtlantic region excluding the far western part in northern Illinois, which had not
been incorporated in PJM under previous analysis) engage in significant inter-region
electricity exchanges with outside markets.13
Given these reasons, I argue that the residual demand curve in Figure 2.2 for SPP
is very close to being vertical such that the miscalculation due to differences between
competitive-benchmark prices indicated by point B and C is negligible. Based on this
argument, I find the competitive price by returning the marginal cost based on the
constructed competitive supply curve and the observed demand.
Moreover, different from previous literature, I cannot observe the actual wholesale
electricity prices in the SPP market during the data period. Previous literature
13

According to the EIA report, the import in California represented about 25% of the in-state
electricity supply, and the substantial flow from low-cost nuclear and coal capacities from the Midwest
to eastern coast (indicated by the red arrow) represented about 16.7% of the in-state generation.
See more details in EIA reports available at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?
id=4270.
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Figure 2.3: Annual Net Power Flows across Regions in North America
Source: EIA figure based on FERC form 714 data, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
cfm?id=4270. The figure shows the annual net power flows across regions in North America in
2010. SPP here is indicated by region “Central” excluding Nebraska. The figure shows that the net
exchange of electricity between SPP and outside regions is very limited.

analyze the price-cost markup in centralized spot or day-ahead market market
where price information is easily accessible from the RTO/ISO.14 In contrast, during
the sample period, all electricity wholesale transactions in the SPP market are
realized through decentralized bilateral trading directly between firms or indirectly
via brokers, making the price information more opaque. Instead, I employ the best
data available to approximate the wholesale prices, that is, the hourly System Lambda
data, which is an estimate of the marginal cost of electricity generation in a given hour
in a power control area. It is employed in earlier literature (Graff Zivin et al., 2014)
for markets under similar scenarios as the SPP market. In a restructured market
where centralized wholesale market design is established such as that in California,
the system lambda would simply be the market prices. I take the system lambda in
each power control area and calculate the market-level average weighted by the hourly
generation in the respective power control area.15 If the lambda data is missing for a
14

A centralized market assigns the rights to supply based on bids made by firms, aggregates the
offers to sell and buy and determines market-clearing prices.
15
As discussed in later subsection, I focus on fossil-fuel capacities when construct the market
competitive supply curve. Accordingly, I weight the system lambda by fossil-fuel generation in each
power control area.
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power control area, I take the most costly unit that is turned on and use the marginal
cost of that unit as the marginal cost of the generation of the power control area.

2.3.2

Sample Period

The establishment of the SPP as a RTO and the divestiture of transmission control
occurred in October 2004. I focus on the the following summer from April through
September 2005 to detect the potential problem of market power associated with
the restructuring. It is likely that the regulators might not have understood and
taken correspondent actions toward all possible manners in which market power
could be exercised by the firms right after the market restructuring. I focus on
the summer period for two reasons. First, demand during summer is generally high
such that generation and transmission capacity constraints are likely to bind. This
means that a single firm’s residual demand is inelastic, making it more prone to
exercising market power. Second, when demand is high, planned outage of generating
units due to scheduled maintenance is irrelevant. This facilitates the simulation of
competitive supply curves indicating aggregate productions using the least costly
capacities available, as is further discussed in the following subsection. I compare the
sample period of summer 2005 with that of 2003 as the system lambda data in 2004
is missing for the vast majority of the firms.
In order to attribute the changes in price-cost markups to market power and
investigate its extent, researchers have to take into account the variations in supply
and demand factors that could also drive up the electricity prices in a perfectly
competitive market. Table 2.3 provides information on the changes in the monthly
demand in the SPP electricity market, available from SPP’s State of Market Report
(2008). The last three columns show the percentage change for a month-to-month
comparison between years during 2003 to 2005. From the table statistics, we can see
that there existed minor growth in demand between summer 2003 and 2005, except
for June and September.
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Table 2.3: Change in Monthly Demand: Year 2003 - 2005
Month
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

2003
15476
13715
13840
13505
15041
16407
20660
20619
15205
13866
13494
14792

2004
16004
15131
14222
13684
16399
17252
19553
18953
17245
14905
14298
16277

2005
16210
13801
14770
13842
16137
19207
21137
21130
18491
15504
14775
17074

% Change 2003-2004
0.034
0.103
0.028
0.013
0.09
0.052
-0.054
-0.081
0.134
0.075
0.06
0.1

% Change 2004-2005
0.013
-0.088
0.039
0.012
-0.016
0.113
0.081
0.115
0.072
0.04
0.033
0.049

% Change 2003-2005
0.047
0.006
0.067
0.025
0.073
0.171
0.023
0.025
0.216
0.118
0.095
0.154

Notes: the data is monthly total electric energy usage (GWh) within SPP by month and
year. The last three column shows the percent change between 2003-2004, 2004-2005, and
2003-2005 for each month. The data is obtained from SPP State of Market Report 2008.

Table 2.4: SPP Market Summary Statistics for
Production Costs: Summers of 2003 and 2005
Variable
Summer of 2003
Coal Input Costs
NG Input Costs
SO2 Permit Price
MC Coal Units
MC NG Units

Units

Mean

SD

% Min

Max

$/MMBtu
$/MMBtu
$/Ton
$/MWh
$/MWh

1.09
5.36
172.11
13.79
62.84

0.21
0.47
8.15
4.71
13.13

0.35
3.85
161
7.08
29.98

1.62
10.33
185
35.53
152.21

Summer of 2005
Coal Input Costs
NG Input Costs
SO2 Permit Price
MC Coal Units
MC NG Units

$/MMBtu
$/MMBtu
$/Ton
$/MWh
$/MWh

1.21
7.57
828.91
17.89
85.06

0.26
1.32
46.72
8.07
26.08

0.69
5.43
725
8.17
38.98

2.33
12.86
895
57.60
188.82

Notes: coal and natural gas input costs are receipt prices
by power plants in SPP, obtained from FERC 423 Form.
SO2 permit prices are based on data provided by BGC
Partners, which is a leading brokerage firm. Marginal costs
of coal and natural-gas units incorporate both fuel costs and
environmental costs of operation.
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On the supply side, Table 2.4 describes the summary statistics of production
costs for firms in the SPP electricity market. First, fuel input prices increased from
2003 to 2005. The mean coal and natural gas prices rose by 11 percent and 41
percent respectively. Moreover, during the study period, power producers in the SPP
market also suffered from environmental costs under compliance of SO2 cap-and-trade
program.16 Notably, the mean SO2 permit price increased dramatically from 172.11
dollars/ton to 828.91 dollars/ton from summer 2003 to summer 2005. Even though
the coal units did not encounter an increase in fuel prices as significant as the naturalgas units, they are heavier polluters in SO2 such that the dramatic increase in the
permit price also resulted in significant increase in production costs of coal units.
With both fuel costs and environmental costs combined, the production costs of coal
and natural-gas units increased from 13.79 dollars/MWh to 17.89 dollars/MWh, and
62.84 dollars/MWh to 85.06 dollars/MWh respectively.

2.3.3

Marginal Costs of Fossil-fuel Generating Units

In this subsection, I discuss how I construct the market competitive supply curves and
compute competitive-benchmark prices in details. I focus on the fossil-fuel generating
units only. The reasons are: (1) shown in Table 1, non-fossil-fuel generating capacities
represent only small proportion in the total generating capacity in the SPP market;
(2) they are always infra-marginal in term of setting the market price since their
marginal costs are generally thought be zero.
As mentioned above, estimating the competitive supply curves in SPP first
requires estimating the marginal costs for all generating units.

Following the

previously literature, I assume constant marginal costs for all units.

Based on

hourly observations on unit operation information, i.e., generation, emission, and
fuel usage, I calculate the average input (fuel and emission) required per unit output
for a given year. The logic to update the statistics on a yearly basis is to allow for
16

The NOx cap-and-trade program did not cover firms in the SPP market.
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the possibility that the unit production efficiency might change associated with the
market restructuring, the evidence of which is found in other restructured electricity
markets in the previous literature. Moreover, I also observe fossil fuel receipt prices
and emission (SO2 ) permit prices on a monthly basis. Combine the two sets of data,
I estimate the monthly marginal costs for all units. In sum, unit i’s marginal cost of
production (ciym ) in year y month m would be:
SO

uel
ciym = P riceFiym
× Heat Rateiy + P riceiym2 × Emission RateSO2
iy

(2.3)

uel
is fuel prices procured by the power plant of unit i, HeatRateiy is fuel
where P riceFijm
SO

heat input required per unit of electricity generation, P riceijm2 is the permit prices
SO

2
for SO2 emission, Emission Rateijym
stands for average quantity of SO2 emitted by

unit i per unit of output. This means I am able to construct competitive supply
curves on a monthly basis in the empirical analysis. Data sources I take advantage
of for the calculation is discussed in Appendix B.
In addition to the marginal costs of the units, information of their production
capacities is also needed for constructing the market competitive supply curve. Under
the common technique, an on-off strategy is assumed for all generating units. That
is, unit i would run at full capacity if and only if the competitive price equals or
exceeds the marginal costs. Combining information on marginal costs and generation
capacity at the unit level, for each given month in the data sample period, I assign a
dispatch order of the units starting from the least costly to the most. The competitive
supply curve would simply be a step-wise function based on each unit’s marginal cost,
capacity and the dispatch order. Figure 2.3 shows the constructed competitive supply
curves in SPP market in August 2003 and 2005. From the graph we can see there
are supply shocks that shift up the curves from 2003 to 2005. This is consistent with
the input price increases shown in the summary statistics of Table 2.4. There is a
significant kink around 20,000 megawatt, representing a switch from coal to natural
capacities. Notably, since there is extensive natural-gas capacity in SPP market, there
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Figure 2.4: SPP Fossil-Fuel Units Marginal Cost Curves, August
exist potential opportunities for firms to withhold generations of coal-fired units to
drive natural-gas units on the margin for higher prices.
The supply curves in Figure 2.4 have not adjusted for possible scenarios of unit
outages. Generating units cannot be operated constantly and have to be shut down
from time to time, limiting the available capacity. There are two main types of unit
outages. The first one is “planned outage” for routine maintenance. As discussed
previously, unit maintenance is typically scheduled in low-demand spring and fall
seasons for profit concerns. For this reason, such outages are not a concern since this
paper looks into summer months for analysis.
The other type of outage is due to unplanned reasons. Such “forced outages” have
been treated as random, independent events in previous literature (Wolfram, 1999;
Borenstein et al., 2002; Mansur, 2007). It is assumed that for a given unit i, “forced
outage” can happen at any moment with a probability, which is often referred as
the forced outage factor, f ofi . Forced outages affect unit availability and should be
accounted for when the competitive supply curve is simulated. One of the possible
manner to handle the concern is to derate the capacity of a unit to the expected
value, i.e., capi · (1 − f ofi ). However, this method is problematic in the sense that
based on such unit expected capacity, the construct of market marginal cost curve,
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which is convex, would understate the actual expected cost at any given output level,
and consequently overstate the price-cost margin applied to detect market power.17
Instead, following the previous literature (Wolfram, 1999; Borenstein et al., 2002;
Mansur, 2007), I take advantage of the historical forced outage factors and perform
Monte Carlo simulations to simulate the market marginal cost curves. In each hour
in the sample, I make a random draw from a [0,1] uniform distribution for each unit.
As long as the random draw is less than a unit’s forced outage factor, the unit is
simulated to undergo an unplanned outage. With units i = 1, ... ,N ordered according
to incremental marginal costs, the market marginal cost C(Q) would be the marginal
cost of the kth cheapest generating unit that is necessary to meet the demand of Q,
given the unavailability of certain units that have randomly assigned to suffer forced
outages in the iteration of the simulation. In other words, k is determined by

k = arg min{x|

x
X

I(i) · capi > Q},

(2.4)

i=1

and


1, if  > f of
it
i
I(i) =
 0, otherwise

(2.5)

where it is a random draw for unit i in hour t, capi is the generation capacity of
unit i, I(i) is an indicator variable that takes value of 1 if unit i is simulated to be
available (with a probability of (1 - f ofi )) and 0 otherwise.
For each hour, the Monte Carlo simulation of each unit’s forced outage is repeated
100 times.

I then calculate the mean of these simulations of the competitive-

benchmark price P¯t∗ for each hour. This is an unbiased estimate of the expected
prices that would have occurred had the market been perfectly competitive. The
price-cost markups (Pt − P¯t∗ )/Pt are computed to measure the market power, which
I use to detect the variation before and after the divestiture of transmission control.
17

Under Jensen’s inequality, for a random variable q and any convex function C(·), we have
E(C(q)) > C(E(q)).
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Figure 2.5: Kernel Regressions of Lerner Index: Summer 2003 and 2005

2.3.4

Detecting the Change of Market Price-cost Margin

In this section, I investigate how the market price-cost margin derived based on above
methodology changes after the market restructuring activities occurred in the SPP
electricity market. If the margin increases, it would provide evidence that certain
firms were enabled to exercise market power by setting wholesale prices. As mentioned
above, I compare the market conditions between summer 2005 and summer 2003 to
perform the empirical analysis.
Figure 2.5 provides a graphic illustration of the relationship between the estimated
market price-cost margin and the demand met by the fossil-fuel generators in the SPP
market. Specifically, I apply kernel regressions of the hourly price-cost markups, (i.e.,
the Lerner Indexes) against the demand realized by fossil-fuel generation in the SPP
in the summer months of 2003 and 2005. Given an upward shift of the curve, it
seems like that the markup increases significantly from summer 2003 to summer 2005
at all levels of demand. Notably, the increase is dramatic at high demand level by
approximately 10 percent, while there is only minor increase in the markup at low
demand level. Although no conclusive statements can be drawn from the graphical
illustration, it still provides preliminary evidence that divestiture of transmission
control enabled at least some wholesalers to exercise market power.
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Another pattern of the relationship deserving discussion is that for each summer,
the markup is high at low level of demand below 20,000 MW and starts to tumble
beyond that level. Notice that the cutoff point corresponds exactly to the significant
kink of the constructed supply curve shown in Figure 2.3, where the regional capacities
switch from coal units to natural-gas units. There are several potential explanations
for this correspondence. For one thing, when cheap coal units began to reach capacity
limits, it is likely that the extensive resources of natural-gas capacity provide firms
the opportunity to withhold coal units to force more expensive natural-gas units to
the margin to obtain abnormal markup.
For another, this pattern might also be attributed to overestimation under current
calculation. First, the computation of the competitive supply curve does not account
for possible generation and transmission capacity constraints. This might lead to
scenarios where even though low-cost coal units are assigned to be dispatched, certain
natural-gas units still have to run and determine the wholesale prices as the units on
the margin. Second, the underestimation of market marginal cost due to failure
to account for net import/export is the high at the kink.18 Yet, overestimation
of the markup due to both reasons would shrink significantly when the demand
level increases to the level where natural-gas units are supposed to serve under a
competitive market.
I then turn to regression analysis to investigate the problem.

Specifically, I

compare the price-cost markup (Pt − P¯t∗ )/Pt by applying empirical models with the
18

At the switching point between coal and natural capacity, as price fall from the actual to
competitive price, net import would decrease (or net export would increase), much more expensive
natural-gas units have to be utilized, which is on the margin to set the wholesale price. Thus
failure to account for inter-market exchanges would cause significant underestimation of the true
competitive prices and thus significant overestimation of the markup.
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following specification:

M arkupt =α + β1 · Restructuringt + β2 · Loadt +

24
X

ηj · 1[hour = j]

j=1

+

7
X

9
X

(2.6)

ηj · 1[day = k] · 1[month = m] + t

k=1 m=4

where t is a given hour, Restructuring is an indicator for the time period after the
market restructuring (i.e, summer 2005), load is hourly regional demand realized by
fossil-fuel capacity, 1[hour = j] is an indicator variable for hour j, 1[day = k] is a
day-of-week indicator for the kth day of week, and 1[month = m] is dummy variable
for the month m. All specifications are based on the OLS estimation with robust
standard errors.19
The coefficient of primary interest is β1 , which presents an estimate of the change
in the markup after the divestiture of transmission control from vertically integrated
utility firms. The estimation results are provided in Table 2.5. Model specifications
vary in the data sample selected. In the first column, I include all hourly observations
during summer months (April-September) of 2003 and 2005, while in columns 2-5
I restrict the sample to hours associated with the first to the fourth quartiles of
the total market demand realized by the fossil fuel capacity. Despite the model
specification variations, the coefficient of primary interest are robust and are all
statistically larger than zero at the 1 percent level. This implies that market markup
in the SPP electricity market increases at all level of demand after the specific market
restructuring, as indicated in Figure 2.5.
As for the magnitude of the increase of the market markup, it varies from
approximately 6 percent to 10 percent across the quartiles of demand realized by the
fossil fuel capacity. Comparing between the quartiles, we can find that the increase in
the markup becomes gradually larger as the demand rises and reaches the peak at the
19

Prais-Winsten estimation is also applied for robustness checks, which provides similar results.
However, the Durbin-Watson statistics of all specifications are higher than the upper bound of the
5% confidence interval for positive AR(1) autocorrelation.
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Table 2.5: Comparison of the Lerner Index
All
Restructuring
N
Adj. R2
Avg. Hourly TC
(in Million $)
Estimated Increase in TC
(in Million $)

0.0935∗∗∗
(0.00242)
8784
0.680
1.98

1st Quartile
Regional Load
0.0613∗∗∗
(0.00201)
2197
0.367
1.15

2nd Quartile
Regional Load
0.0946∗∗∗
(0.00263)
2195
0.794
1.50

3rd Quartile
Regional Load
0.105∗∗∗
(0.00329)
2196
0.517
2.00

4th Quartile
Regional Load
0.0846∗∗∗
(0.00297)
2196
0.589
2.89

0.19
(0.00479)

0.07
(0.00231)

0.14
(0.00394)

0.21
(0.00659)

0.24
(0.00858)

Notes: All specifications are based on OLS regressions with robust standard errors. PraisWinsten estimation is also applied for robustness checks, which provides similar results. However,
the Durbin-Watson statistics of all specifications are higher than the upper bound of the 5%
confidence interval for positive AR(1) autocorrelation. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and *p <0.1.

third quartile. One possible explanation is that the exercise of market power through
generation withholding is easier to be detected when the demand is low, while it is
less feasible when the pool of additional supply sources dwindle when the demand is
high.
Based on the estimates of the increase in the price-cost markup, I compute the
increases in procurement costs through the electricity wholesale market at different
demand levels. Since retail rates are fixed by regulation, these represent wealth
transfers from some utility firms to those who are net sellers in the wholesale market.
To derive the estimates, I first calculate the average hourly total procurement costs
overall and in each of the load quartiles. I then evaluate at the mean of the average
hourly costs to estimate the added costs of procuring electricity due to the enhanced
market power. As shown in the table, the increases vary from 70,000 dollars in an
hour of the first demand quartile to 240,000 dollars in an hour of the fourth demand
quartile.
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2.4

Generation-Withholding Behaviors of the Net
Wholesalers

Under the theoretical prediction discussed in Section 2.3, I investigate in this section
the market power issue in the SPP market through analysis on the differential
incentives between two groups of firms (the net sellers and buyers in the wholesale
market) to engage in capacity-withholding behaviors after the market restructuring.
This also provides an explanation for the underlying mechanism for the results of
increased price-cost margins found in Section 2.3.4. Specifically, I test whether unit
capacity factors (i.e., generation as a percent of unit designed capacity) of the firms
with net selling position dropped relative to the other firms. Despite the large shares
of some of the fringe suppliers, they are modeled as price takers based on the argument
that it is likely that they don’t have the incentives to manipulate prices.
Empirically, I identify net sellers (i.e., Southwestern Public Service corporation,
Westar Energy and Kansas City Power and Light) through yearly power sale/purchase
data available from SPP’s State of Market Reports. Based on ownership information
from the eGrid data from EPA, I match the generating units to each firm in
the wholesale market. To test the hypothesis, I apply the difference-in-difference
methodology with model specifications of the following general form:
CFit = α + β · Restructuringt + γ · Restructuringt · Selleri + Zit0 · Xit + ηi + εit (2.7)
where CFit is capacity factor of unit i in hour t, Restructuring is an indicator for
summer 2005 after the market restructuring, selleri is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if unit i is owned by a firm that is a net seller, Xit is a set of other
control variables, and ηi is the unit fixed effect. All standard error is clustered at the
unit level to control for potential serial correlation in the error term.
In line with Mansur (2007), in Xit I also control for estimates of unit competitive
production decisions simulated under methodology discussed in Section 2.3. This is
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out of the concern that restructuring might affect competitive firms asymmetrically.
Moreover, recall that the estimates also control for the demand and supply factor
changes during the data span. Thus, inclusion of the variable serves to control for
unobserved supply or demand shocks that are endogenous to production decisions. Xit
also include indicators that controls for demand fluctuations, such as the indicator
for the hour of the day, the interaction between the indicators for the day of the
week and those for the month of the year, and dummy variables for the deciles of
the demand realized by the fossil-fuel units. I also include unit marginal cost (fuel
cost plus environmental cost) to check whether the simulated competitive production
decision can fully account for supply shocks. The coefficient of the indicator variable
Restructuring measures the common change in capacity factors to all firms in the
summer of 2005 after the divestiture of transmission control in the SPP market.
β + η measures the average change of capacity factors of units of the net sellers after
the restructuring. The difference-in-different coefficient, γ, is the estimate of the
behavior changes in unit capacity utilization of the net sellers following the market
restructuring relative to other firms.
Table 2.6 reports the results of empirical model shown in equation (2.7) with 5
specifications. The specifications vary by the included control regressors. Except
for model 3, all specifications provide robust estimates of the coefficient of primary
interest, γ. It is estimated to be approximately 0.03, implying that on average, firms
with a net selling position reduced capacity factor by 3% relative to others to induce
higher wholesale prices. In model 1 and 3, I do not include the indicators that control
for demand variations, while in the rest of the models they are controlled for in the
regression. In model 1 and 2, I do not control for the unit capacity factors under
estimated competitive production decisions, which I add into the specifications for
robustness checks in model 3-5. In model 5, I add the unit marginal costs to control
for unit supply shocks. However, the correspondent coefficient on unit marginal
cost is not statistically different from zero, indicating adequate predictive power on
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Table 2.6: Capacity Withholding for Net Wholesale Sellers
Restructuring

(1)
0.0448∗∗∗
(0.00777)

(2)
0.0158∗∗
(0.00774)

(3)
0.0375∗∗∗
(0.00734)

(4)
0.0147∗
(0.00754)

(5)
0.0206∗∗
(0.00937)

Restructuring
× Net Seller

-0.0294∗∗
(0.0142)

-0.0303∗∗
(0.0142)

-0.0222
(0.0136)

-0.0279∗∗
(0.0138)

-0.0288∗∗
(0.0140)

0.205∗∗∗
(0.0196)

0.0648∗∗∗
(0.0193)

0.0588∗∗∗
(0.0191)

Yes
Yes
1804342
0.642

-0.000334
(0.000224)
Yes
Yes
1765109
0.638

Constructed
Capacity Factor
MC
Other Controls
Unit FE
N
Adj. R2

No
Yes
1804342
0.572

Yes
Yes
1804342
0.641

No
Yes
1804342
0.585

Notes: Dependent variable is actual capacity factor, which is hourly
load as a percent of designed nameplate capacity, by generating
unit and hour. Unit fixed effects are included in all specifications.
“Restructuring” is an indicator for the time period after the market
restructuring (which here is summer 2005) and “Net Seller” is an
indicator for generating units owned by firms with a net position of
sale in the wholesale market. “Other Controls” is a set of variables
that control for the hourly demand fluctuations, including indicators for
the hour of the day, the interaction between the indicators of the day
of the week and those of the month of the year, and dummy variables
for the deciles of the regional total fossil-fuel generation. “MC” is the
unit marginal cost (fuel cost plus SO2 emission cost). Standard errors
are clustered at the unit level to take care of potential autocorrelation
problem. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and *p <0.1.
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the supply shocks of the simulated capacity factors under competitive production
decisions.
I then look into firms’ anti-competitive behaviors on the operation of coal and
natural-gas units separately. Figure 2.6(a) shows the differential trends of the monthly
averages of unit capacity factors between the two groups of firms for coal capacities.
The monthly averages are based on hourly observations and weighted by the unit
load. The vertical lines represent the bounds of the time windows of summer 2003
and summer 2005. From the figure, one can tell that the gap between weighted
averages of the two groups increases after the restructuring (October 2004). Even
though the mean of unit capacity factor of the net buyers who are on the competitive
fringe stays relatively stable, there is a significant drop in the mean of the net sellers,
especially during July to September in 2005 when the demand is expected to be the
highest during the year. The similar comparison for natural-gas units between the
net sellers and buyers is demonstrated in Figure 2.6(b). From the figure, we can
see that the gap between average unit capacity factors of the two groups of firms
shrinks for natural-gas units. Specifically, under a steadily growth of demand across
the summers of the years in the data sample (shown in Table 2.3), unlike the firms
on the competitive fringe, firms with a net selling position did not increase capacity
factor of natural gas units to adjust to the market condition. In this sense, they
withheld the capacity to set the up the prices.
Evidence demonstrated in Figure 2.6(a) and 2.6(b) is confirmed in regression
analysis. I perform the difference-in-difference model outlined in equation (7) for coal
and natural-gas units separately. As well as focusing on the entire summer months
(April to September) , I also vary the specifications by looking specifically into June
to August when the demand is the highest. In the first and third column, I include all
hours during summers of 2003 and 2005. For coal units, the estimate of the relative
change in unit capacity factor of firms with a net selling position is not significantly
different from zero. In contrast, the estimate for natural-gas capacities is statistically
lower than zero. The result shows that the net sellers withheld capacity of their
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(a) Coal Units

(b) NG Units

Figure 2.6: Capacity Factors of the Net Wholesale Sellers and Buyers
Note: capacity factor is generation as a percent of the nameplate capacity. The statistics are based
on data of hourly unit load available from EPA Clean Air Market data. The statistics are calculated
as averages weighted by load. The vertical lines indicate the sample period of summer (April to
September) of 2003 and 2005.

natural gas units by approximately 2.6 percent relative to other firms. In column 2
and 4, I restrict the data sample to June to August. In line with the regression results
(shown in Table 2.5) that the extent of enhanced power tends to be generally higher as
demand level rises, the magnitude of estimates of γ increases for both coal and naturalgas units when the comparison is restricted within June to August. On the one hand
side, there is significant evidence that during June to August, coal units of net sellers
experienced a drop in capacity factor by approximately 5 percent relative to those of
the firms on the competitive fringe. On the other hand side, the estimated relative
decrease in capacity factor of natural-gas units of the net sellers is approximately 5
percent, larger than that when all months between April to September are included
in the data sample.

2.5

Conclusion

Economists generally believe that promoting competitive markets can enhance
efficiency and welfare. Under this spirit, deregulation activities in the power industry
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Table 2.7: Test of Capacity Withholding Behavior for Net
Wholesale Sellers: Coal Units and NG Units
Coal Units
All Summer
-0.00939
(0.0159)

Coal Units
June-August
-0.00814
(0.0128)

NG Units
All Summer
0.0213∗∗
(0.00830)

NG Units
June-August
0.0173
(0.0106)

Restructuring
× Net Seller

-0.0165
(0.0305)

-0.0481∗∗
(0.0196)

-0.0260∗∗
(0.0129)

-0.0454∗∗∗
(0.0149)

Constructed
Capacity Factor

0.0363
(0.0283)

-0.0102
(0.0186)

0.0738∗∗∗
(0.0273)

0.0901∗∗∗
(0.0253)

Other Controls
Unit FE
N
adj. R2

Yes
Yes
474336
0.258

Yes
Yes
238464
0.360

Yes
Yes
1330006
0.479

Yes
Yes
672864
0.528

Restructuring

Notes: Dependent variable is the actual capacity factor, which is
hourly load as a percent of designed nameplate capacity, by generating
unit and hour. Unit fixed effects are included in all specifications.
“Restructuring” is an indicator for the time period after the market
restructuring (which here is summer 2005) and “Net Seller” is an
indicator for generating units owned by firms with a net position of
sale in the wholesale market. “Other Controls” include indicators for
the hour of the day, the interaction between the indicators of the day of
the week and those of the month of the year, and dummy variables for
the deciles of the regional total fossil-fuel generation. Models 1-2 and
model 3-4 are based on observations on coal-fired units and NG-fired
units. In model 3 and 4, I focus on high-demand summer months
(June-August). Standard errors are clustered at the unit level to
take care of potential within-unit serial correlation problem. Standard
errors are included in the parenthesis. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and *p
<0.1.
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became a general momentum after the mid-1990s and were enacted in many states
in the U.S.. Facing concerns on the huge up-front implementation costs held by
the opponents, economists and policy makers devoted significant attention to the
evaluation of the welfare implications of the dramatic market restructuring. This can
be a difficult task as researchers must disentangle various aspects associated with the
deregulation in order to make clear policy recommendations. By taking advantage of
a unique electricity market, Southwest Power Pool, this paper evaluates one specific
aspect of market restructuring activities, that is, the divestiture of transmission
control, and investigate whether market power arises under the specific restructuring.
Previous literature have shown that despite potential operating efficiency gains
within plants or at regional aggregate level, substantial market failures to allow
wholesalers to set prices also come along with the restructuring of the power industry.
This study demonstrates that even in an electricity market where restructuring
activities only required the divestiture of transmission control, certain firms have
incentives to engage in anti-competitive behaviors to drive up wholesale costs. After
the divestiture of transmission control, the price-cost margin in the SPP wholesale
market increased by six to ten percent depending on the level of the demand,
indicating an added costs of procuring electricity as large as 0.24 million dollars
within an hour.
I also investigate the underlying mechanism of the results. Specifically, I identify
two groups of firms with distinct incentives to engage in anti-competitive behaviors:
the net sellers and buyers in the wholesale market. I find that after the restructuring,
three firms with a net selling position in the wholesale market reduced capacity
utilization by approximate 3 percent to drive up the price, as indicated by a simple
Cournot model. Although the reduction is relatively small in scale compared to earlier
analysis by Mansur (2007) under the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland (PJM)
market, the paper’s results still caution regulators that they should pay attention to
firms’ anti-competitive behaviors even only the transmission control is divested, and

82

they should especially target on firms with a net selling position in the wholesale
market.
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Chapter 3
Pass-through from Fossil Fuel
Market Prices to Procurement
Costs of the U.S. Power Producers
3.1

Introduction

The change in prices in response to a cost shock, i.e., cost pass-through, is a key
question that receives broad attention in economics. In international economics, there
are a series of studies that investigate the transmission of exchange rate fluctuations
to prices of imported goods (among others, see Goldberg and Knetter, 1997). The
analysis of cost pass-through also provides important implications on the issue of tax
incidence in public economics (Marion and Muehlegger, 2011) and price discrimination
(Aguirre et al., 2010), merger assessment (Weyl and Fabinger, 2013) and cartel
damage quantifications (Verboven and van Dijk, 2009) in industrial organization.
Cost pass-through is also a major topic in the energy economics. Earlier cost passthrough analyses in the electric power industry mainly focused on the transmission of
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emission costs to electricity prices, especially in the context of the European Union’s
Emissions Trading System (ETS).1
In the current study, we look at a specific pass-through in the energy market: the
changes in fossil fuel procurement costs for the U.S. electricity producers resulting
from fluctuations in corresponding spot market prices. We investigate whether there is
stickiness in the pass-through from fossil fuel spot prices to the U.S. power producers’
procurement costs, and if there is, to what extent the sluggishness of the pass-through
process is. We measure the specific pass-through for three types of fossil fuels: coal,
natural gas and petroleum. Understanding on the question has intellectual value for
analyzing the impact of changes in fossil fuel spot prices on the U.S. electricity sector
and the overall economy. Examples of recent significant changes in the U.S. fossil
fuel spot markets include increases in coal prices due to demand changes in the world
market, and the dramatic drop in natural gas prices as a result of the technological
breakthrough of hydraulic fracturing. However, we are aware of no previous studies
devoted to this question.
In line with the pass-through literature, we find incomplete pass-through from
fossil fuel spot market prices to receipt costs of power plants, specifically for coal.
The major channels of pass-through incompleteness identified in the literature include:
(1) the strategic adjustment of markups associated with cost shocks; (2) the presence
of a large proportion of costs which remain unaffected by the observed cost shocks
(e.g., non-traded costs in the exchange rate pass-through literature in international
economics); (3) the price rigidity and other dynamic factors; (4) the mismatch
between observed cost shocks and a firm’s actual opportunity costs (Nakamura and
Zerom, 2010; Fabra and Reguant, 2014).
In this paper, we explore a channel within the realm of price rigidity: duration
of contracts made between power plants and fossil fuel suppliers. Generally, power
plants purchase coal on a contracted long-term basis, while natural gas mostly in the
1

See Zachmann and Von Hirschhausen (2008), Fezzi and Bunn (2009), Fell (2010), Kirat and
Ahamada (2011), Sijm et al. (2012), Fell et al. (2013), Lo Prete and Norman (2013), Fabra and
Reguant (2014), etc.
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spot market. We find that the pass-through from spot price changes to delivered
contract costs for power plants are faster and more complete for natural gas (and oil)
than coal. A 1% change in natural gas spot price can lead to an approximately 0.85%
change in the contract prices received by the power plants within 1 month. However,
a 1% change in coal spot price can only lead to an approximately 0.11% change in
the contract prices received by power plants even after 12 months.
We also examine how the pass-through pattern varies under different scenarios.
First, we compare the pattern between traditional regulated power plants and divested
Independent Power Producers (IPPs). Previous literature on deregulation in the
electric power industry documents evidence that divested power plants operated
more efficiently under competition pressure. Specifically, deregulated coal-fired plants
were able to substantially reduce prices paid for coal relatively to those without any
regulatory change (Chan et al., 2013; Cicala, 2015; Jha, 2015). Given these empirical
results, people might wonder whether transmission of fossil fuel market prices to
contract prices also differs between plants of different regulatory status. For natural
gas purchases, we document evidence that the transmission of spot prices to power
producers’ procurement costs is faster within deregulated power plants. In contrast,
we don’t find any significant differences in the pass-through pattern across regulatory
status for coal purchases.
Second, we analyze whether the pass-through varies given a positive market price
change versus a negative one. Asymmetric price adjustment has been empirically
documented in a number of commodity markets (Peltzman, 2000), especially for
the fuel market (Borenstein et al., 1997; Brown and Yücel, 2000). Zachmann and
Von Hirschhausen (2008) first raised the puzzle of an asymmetric pass-through from
European Union’s CO2 emission prices to wholesale electricity prices. Mokinski and
Wölfing (2014) document empirical evidence of asymmetric adjustment of wholesale
electricity prices in response to CO2 emission prices. We find that market prices of
natural gas have faster pass-through under negative shocks. In contrast, we don’t
find evidence of asymmetric pass-through for coal or oil purchases.
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Third, we are able to measure the pass-through patterns of coal extracted from
three major deposits in the U.S. with distinct characteristics: the Powder River Basin
(thereafter, “PRB”), the Illinois Basin and Central Appalachia (thereafter, “CAPP”).
Coal varies widely on many aspects (e.g., sulfur and heat content) among the three
origins.2 Given the different characteristics, spot prices for them are significantly
different from each other.
The paper has intellectual value in several aspects. First, the study confirms the
fast and complete pass-through from natural gas spot prices to procurement costs of
power producers. Given volatile natural gas market prices and an increasing share of
natural gas in the fuel mix for electricity generation due to the hydraulic fracturing
mining technology breakthrough, our results indicate that it become increasingly
harder for the power producers to plan their business and hedge against the market
risk of input procurement costs. Since the changes in natural gas prices eventually
fall on the consumers, it means that the increasing share of natural gas generation
might hurt low income households.
Second, it also has implications on the welfare distribution effects of cheap natural
gas prices due to technology breakthrough of hydraulic fracturing. The relative
complete and fast pass-through of natural gas spot prices indicates a large part of
welfare gains of cheap natural gas is also able to fall on power producers and end
consumers.3
Third, we document evidence that there are distinct pass-through patterns from
fossil fuel spot prices to procurement costs across different regulatory status. The
transmission is faster for deregulated power plants for natural gas purchases. This
2

According to Busse and Keohane (2007), the median sulfur content of PRB coal is around 0.33%
by weight, compared to much higher medians for Central Appalachia coal (0.90%) and Illinois Basin
coal (2.7%); PRB coal also has much lower heat content than Central Appalachian and Illinois Basin
Coal. The median heat content for PRB coal is 8674 British thermal units per pound, while the
statistics are 12490 and 11309 for Central Appalachian and the Illinois Basin coal.
3
The distribution of welfare gains between power producers and end consumers would depend
on whether the electricity market is restructured or not. In a traditional regulated market, the
consumers are the residual claimants of any fossil fuel price changes. In contrast, power producers
become directly the residual claimant in a restructured market and it will be difficult to determine
how much welfare gains consumers would obtain.
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is consistent with previous findings that deregulation affects the fossil fuel purchase
behaviors of power plants (Chan et al., 2013; Cicala, 2015; Jha, 2015).4 This implies an
extra cost of deregulation: increasing market risk due to volatility of fuel procurement
costs for power producers.
Fourth, the adjustment lag between fossil fuel spot prices and procurement receipt
prices for power plants also has methodological value by raising the caution for
future empirical works in the U.S. electric power industry: spot prices do not always
reflect the true opportunity costs of using the fuel (Fabra and Reguant, 2014). For
instance, it has implications on constructing counterfactual competitive supply curves
commonly used in the static approach of measuring market power in the electricity
market.5 Most of the literature use respective fossil fuel spot prices to calculate the
marginal costs of generating units and build counterfactual competitive supply curves.
Our results imply that while this might be appropriate for natural-gas-fired units, it
might not be the case for coal-fired units.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the context of the analysis.
Section 3.3 describes the data and summary statistics. In Section 3.4, we present the
baseline empirical model. In section 3.5, we provide the empirical results and the
discussion. Section 3.6 concludes.

3.2
3.2.1

Context
Contract Duration of Different Fossil Fuels

In this paper, we look into one price rigidity that potentially leads to incomplete passthrough: duration of fossil fuel contracts between the power producers and suppliers,
which previous studies has realized as a key factor affecting fuel substitution given
spot price shocks (OECD/IEA, 2013). There is significant difference in contract
4

However, our findings are not sufficient to make causal inference since we do not observe crosssectional variation in regulatory status.
5
See Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), Wolfram (1999), Borenstein et al. (2002), Mansur (2007),
etc.
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duration between the coal and natural gas markets in the U.S. Coal market is
characterized by long contracts: the median contract averages around 2 years in
2014 (Matisoff et al., 2014); 93% of coal consumed for electricity generation in the
U.S. was purchased via long-term contracts of more than a year (rather than spot
contracts) in 2011 (EIA, 2012). In contrast, the standard contract in the natural
gas market is much shorter. In 2011, 66% of natural gas consumed for electricity
generation in the U.S. was purchased via spot contract (EIA, 2012). The result of
short contract terms for natural gas in the U.S. is thought be contributed by the
creation of competitive markets in natural gas and somewhat competitive markets
in transportation (Petrash, 2006). As for contract terms between power producers
and oil suppliers, since oil purchases is generally used for peak or specialized purpose,
spot contracts are also common.

3.2.2

Difficulty of Measuring the Pass-through to Wholesale
Electricity Prices

Most previous literature of cost pass-through in the electricity market focuses on
the transmission of input price shocks (e.g., emission allowance price variations) to
wholesale electricity prices. Although we have detailed plant-level data, we lack some
key variables to measure how shocks in fossil fuel receipt prices lead to changes in
wholesale electricity prices.
For traditional regulated electricity markets, transactions are realized via bilateral
trading where market price determination mechanism is opaque. Also it is unclear
what regulators use as marginal cost estimates for wholesale transactions between
regulated utilities. For restructured markets, the wholesale price is determined by
bidding in multi-unit auctions. Caution should be taken when researchers measure the
responses of the bidding behaviors of the marginal generating unit who sets the market
price to changes in its marginal costs (e.g., fluctuations of fossil fuel procurement
costs). This is because how a firm’s optimal bidding behavior changes depends on not
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only fossil fuel price shocks, but also the strategic adjustment of markups (Wolfram,
1998; Borenstein et al., 2002; Hortacsu and Puller, 2008; Fabra and Reguant, 2014,
etc). To cleanly identify the pass-through from fossil fuel price changes to wholesale
electricity prices, researchers have to tease out the the contribution of strategic
adjustment of markups. The previous literature derives the markup from the firstorder condition of the profit maximization, which depends on the net quantity sold
by the utility firm (i.e., its production minus its vertical commitment), and the slope
of the residual demand faced by the firm. The general approach of the previous
literature is calculating the former by subtracting the firm’s output by purchases from
its subsidiaries, and approximating the latter based on the bid data. Unfortunately,
we don’t access to the above data sets. So we focus on the pass-through between
fossil fuel market prices and procurement costs by power plants.

3.3
3.3.1

Data
Data Description

The study mainly exploits three separate data sets: (1) market spot prices of fossil
fuels; (2) plant-level fossil fuel receipt cost data for electricity producers; (3) cost
estimates of railway transportation.
The first data set is mainly obtained from Bloomberg. From the Bloomberg data,
we obtain spot and future prices for natural gas at several hubs and coal extracted in
the three major deposits in the U.S.: Powder River Basin, Illinois Basin and Central
Appalachian. We also extract West Texas Intermediate spot prices from EIA, which
is widely considered to be the benchmark in the U.S. oil markets. We aggregate the
daily (or weekly) market prices to monthly averages to be consistent with frequency
of the rest of the data.
The main source of the second data set is the records of FERC-423 and EIA423 data form, the “Monthly Report of Cost and Quality of Fuels of Electric Power
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Plants”. FERC-423 form must be filed by all utility electricity-generating plants
with a capacity of at least 50 megawatts, while EIA-423 is designated for the nonutility counterparts with capacity above the same cutoff. After 2008, both forms were
incorporated in survey Form EIA-923.6 The transaction-level data contains purchased
fossil fuel types with details to sub-fuel categories (e.g., bituminous coal), contract
prices (including transportation costs and taxes), quantity of fuel delivered, average
heat content of the fossil fuel, contract terms (e.g., contract type and expiration
date),7 “dirtiness” of the fossil fuel (e.g., average sulfur and ash content), location of
the purchasing plant and the origin of fuel (mine name and location for coal only).
Based on the information, we can categorize the transactions by fuel mining sources
and match with the market prices from Bloomberg.8
Fuel receipt cost data also includes transportation delivery costs. Ideally, having
accurate transportation rate data is desired to understand the pass-through question
under the current analysis, especially for coal transactions. According to EIA report,
railroad is the main transportation mode for coal delivered to electric power plants
(over 70% in 2010). Moreover, rail transportation costs account for a sizable share of
total delivered costs of coals for electric power producers and vary across shipments
of coal originating from different coal basins.9 For these reasons, unobserved changes
in rail transportation rates would bias the estimated results on the pass-through from
6

The non-utility part of the data is not publicly available for privacy protection purpose. We
requested the proprietary data from EIA by signing a non-disclosure agreement.
7
The contract types are divided into “spot market” deliveries (for contracts that expire in less than
one year), and “contract” delivery (for longer-duration contracts). Expiration dates are available
for those that would expire in the next 24 months.
8
We match natural gas purchases to the nearest trading hubs based on major transportation flow
pattern of the U.S. Natural Gas market. See the map available from EIA: http://www.eia.gov/
pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngpipeline/MarketCenterHubsMap.html.
We match spot prices at Waha Hub (TX) for plants in NE and KS, prices at Opal Hub (WY) for
plants at UT, WY and CO, prices at Blanco Hub (NM) for plants at AZ and NM, prices at Chicago
Hub for plants at WI and IL, and prices at AECO Hub (Canada) for plants at IA, MN, ND, MT,
WA, OR and NV, and prices at Henry Hub (LA) for the rest of plants.
9
EIA reports that during 2001-2008, the national average share of rail transportation cost as
percent of total coal delivered costs is 20%. The number could reach as high as 59% for shipments
of coal originating in Powder River Basin. See more details on EIA reports available at http:
//www.eia.gov/coal/transportationrates/archive/2010/trend-coal.cfm.
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Figure 3.1: Rail Transportation Costs for Coal, by Mining Basins
Note: 2001-2007 data is based on the Surface Transportation Board (STB)’s 900-Byte Carload
Waybill Sample. 2008-2010 data is calculated by EIA, which augmented STB’s Waybill sample by
EIA-923 Power Plant Operations Report data.

coal market prices to input receipt cost of power plants. EIA estimates that the
rail transportation costs of coal from mines to power plants rose by 46% nationally
from $ 11.83 to $17.25 per ton from 2001-2010. Figure 3.1 shows the estimated rail
transportation costs for coal originating from three major coal deposit basins analyzed
in the current study. There are substantial increases in the rail delivery costs for coals
from all 3 basins. Unfortunately, we lack detailed data on coal transportation rate
for power plants.
In order to handle the issue, we combine two data sets to approximate the
changes in railroad transportation costs. The first data set is the EIA-estimated
rail transportation cost data ($/ton), which is available on yearly basis, and provides
detailed information about deliveries from each coal basin to each state destination.
For some deliveries, the data is proprietary to protect firms’ competitive advantages.
We use the average cost of deliveries from the same basin for proxies. The second data
set is the Rail Cost Adjustment Factor exploited in Busse and Keohane (2007), which
is a national cost index computed quarterly by the Association of American Railroads
to measure the rate of inflation in railroad input such as labor and fuel. It is also
adjusted for productivity gains. The cost index is used by Surface Transportation
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Board to assess railroad rates. We transform the yearly data from EIA to quarterly
data based on the quarterly deviation of Rail Cost Adjustment Factor as the share
of the yearly average. The transformation is done by using the following formula:

Rail Costy,q=i

RCAFy,q=i −
= Rail Costy +
P4
1

q=i

4

1
4

P4

q=i

RCAFy,q=i

RCAFy,q=i

∗ Rail Costy , (3.1)

where y is a specific year, q is a quarter of year, RCAF is the Rail Cost Adjustment
Factor. We then assume within the same quarter, the rail transportation costs for
coal deliveries to power plants grow at a constant rate. Then we are able to calculate
the monthly time series for rail delivery costs for coal.
We also exploit the North American Industry Classification System Code information available from the records of the EIA-906 data form (also incorporated in EIA-923
after 2008 ), ”Annual Electric Utility Data”, to restrict the sample to electricitygenerating plants in the electric power industry only. We further take advantage
of the EIA Sector Code to identify plants that are divested non-utility Independent
Power Producers (IPPs) and those that are regulated electric utility producers.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Receipt Prices for Power Plants
PRB Coal
IL Coal
CAPP Coal
NG
Oil

Unit

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

N

Cents/MMBtu
Cents/MMBtu
Cents/MMBtu
Cents/MMBtu
Cents/MMBtu

141.9
235.6
179.9
643.6
1287.9

52.3
97.0
74.3
254.3
554.2

12
5.9
31.8
1.6
1

957.5
1022.9
640.0
1785.8
2978.2

46041
74178
16161
138269
27968

Cents/MMBtu
Cents/MMBtu
Cents/MMBtu
Cents/MMBtu
Cents/MMBtu

55.4
165.7
222.7
605.4
1023.2

19.5
53.4
80.9
227.465
436.2

30.6
103.2
111.6
225.7
339.9

117.9
348.2
511.3
1342.3
2308.3

108
108
108
108
108

Dollars/Ton

14.0

5.0

2.4

37.4

8328

Spot Market Prices
PRB Coal
IL Coal
CAPP Coal
NG (Henry Hub)
Oil (WTI)
Rail Transportation Cost

Note: The summary table is based on data from 2002 to 2010. For some natural gas and oil and
purchases with trivial volumes, the receipt prices is overly high. We drop receipt prices of natural and
gas above the 99th percentile.
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3.3.2

Summary Statistics and Variable Trends

The summary statistics of data are shown in Table 3.1. One can see that there are
significant differences between the averages of spot market prices and the receipt
procurement costs of power producers. The differences might result from two factors:
1) different levels of pass-through and 2) transportation delivery costs incorporated in
the receipt price data. Moreover, the mean spot market prices represent much smaller
shares of the receipt costs for coal compared with natural gas and oil. This is in line
with the fact that transportation cost accounts for a more sizable proportion of the
receipt prices for coal. And among the three types of coal from different origins, the
mean spot market price of the PRB coal account for the least share as a percentage of
total delivered receipt price. This corresponds to the fact that the rail transportation
cost accounts for a very large share of delivered receipt price for the PRB coal.
To get a sense of the pass-through from fossil fuel market prices to procurement
costs by power plants, it is illustrative to show their evolution over the sample period.
The trends of changes in fossil fuel prices are shown in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2(a)
displays the fluctuations in fossil fuel spot market prices across time. Note that
contrary to natural gas and other types of coal, the spot market prices of the Powder
River Basin coal only experienced minor fluctuations. Transactions made by power
plants near the relevant coal mining basins are selected to be compared with the
spot market prices. Coal transactions delivered for plants in Colorado are selected to
show how the receipt prices of the PRB coal evolved over the sample period. Coal
transactions delivered for plants in West Virginia are selected to show how the receipt
prices of the Illinois Basin and CAPP coal evolved over the sample period. Compared
with the coal spot market prices show in Figure 3.2(a), the receipt prices present
obvious pattern of incomplete pass-through. This is in contrast to the pass-through
pattern for natural gas. The receipt prices of natural gas for power plants of New
York State displays a paralleled trend to that of the spot market prices, indicating
faster and more complete pass-through.
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(a) Fossil Fuel Spot Market Prices

(b) Average Coal Delivered Receipt Costs in
Colorado

(c) Average Coal Delivered Receipt Costs in
West Virginia

(d) Average NG Delivered Receipt Costs in
New York State

Figure 3.2: Fossil Fuel Spot Market Prices and Delivered Receipt Costs for Power
Plants
Note: the average fossil fuel delivered costs for power plants is weighted by transaction volume. Coal
purchases for plants in Colorado are selected to represent those for the PRB coal. Coal purchases
for plants in West Virginia are selected to represent those for the CAPP and Illinois Basin coal.
Fossil fuel receipt prices for power plants also include delivery costs.

95

3.4

Empirical Strategy

In order to understand how changes in fossil fuel spot prices are transmitted to power
producers’ procurement prices, we apply a common empirical model in the passthrough literature (especially on the pass-through of exchange rate in international
economics),10 which takes the following form:
∆log(F uelP rice)fit

=α+

12
X

βkf · ∆log(SpotP rice)ft−k + Z · X + fit ,

(3.2)

k=1

where t represents a specific month of the sample, i indexes a power plant, f is
a specific type of fossil fuel (coal, natural gas or oil). ∆ represents first difference
transformations. log(F uelP rice)fit is the log of mean delivered cost of transactions
for plant i in month t, log(SpotP rice)ft−k is the log spot market price for fuel f . X is
a vector of control variables. k is the number of lags, which varies from 0 to 12. We
add lagged fossil fuel spot prices to allow for the possibility of gradual adjustment of
power plants’ procurement costs to spot prices, especially given the contract duration
terms discussed in Section 3.2.1. βkf is the coefficient of interest, which measures the
percentage change in receipt prices of fuel f associated with a one percentage change
in the corresponding spot market price k months ago. The cumulative sum of the
P
coefficients, 12
k=0 βk , is then defined to be the aggregate long-run pass-through. The
coefficients are identified off variation in changes of spot prices within a fuel type,
month of year, and a power plant owning firm.
The empirical model is motivated by the fact, as in Campa and Goldberg (2005),
Nakamura and Zerom (2010) and Goldberg and Campa (2010), the regressor is highly
persistent: Dickey-Fuller tests for the hypothesis of a unit root in fossil fuel spot prices
cannot be rejected at a 5% significance level.11 Since the current study focuses only
on measuring the pass-through responses rather than disentangling the underlying
10

See Campa and Goldberg (2005), Nakamura and Zerom (2010), Goldberg and Campa (2010),

etc.
11

We were unable to reject the hypothesis that the series of coal prices at the 3 mining basins,
natural gas prices at various hubs, and WTI oil prices were nonstationary. The Dickey-Fuller unit

96

channels of pass-through, we apply a reduced form approach without building upon
a detailed theoretical model. In line with previous studies in the exchange rate passthrough literature where firms take the exchange rates as given when pricing the
imported goods, the necessary assumption required in the current specification is
that power plants are price takers in the fossil fuel spot markets. We argue that this
is a valid assumption given the fact that the fossil fuel spot markets are all large with
many participates from diverse sectors such that no single power plant (or a power
plant owning firm) has the market power to manipulate the spot prices.12 This form
of empirical model has also been applied in previous studies with data structure very
similar to ours.13
In addition to fossil fuel spot prices, we also control for other variables in X,
including month-of-year fixed effects, change in log rail transportation costs,14 owner
firm fixed effects, etc. We estimate the model using the data described in Section 3,
for monthly changes in procurement costs and spot market prices over the 2002 - 2010
period.15 The standard errors are clustered at the plant level to allow for arbitrary
serial correlation.16
root test on the spot prices in an econometric specification with a time trend rejects the unit root
hypothesis only in natural gas prices at Chicago Hub.
12
Although individual plants or firms can engage in bilateral contracting with the fuel miners
beside purchasing via spot prices, we argue this would not grant them power to manipulate the spot
market prices.
13
The model has been applied in different data structures, such as time series (Campa and
Goldberg, 2005) and panel data sets for both aggregate country- or industry-level studies and detailed
producer- or product-level studies (Goldberg and Campa, 2010; Nakamura and Zerom, 2010). In
this study, we exploit detailed plant-level data to overcome to the shortcomings of aggregate data.
14
Log rail transportation costs are set to zero for natural gas and oil, and for coal plants that are
not matched with the estimated rail cost data from EIA (meaning the delivery is via transportation
mode other than railroads, such as barge, truck, etc.).
15
The data sample ends at 2010 because the EIA estimates of coal rail transportation costs are
only available till 2010.
16
We were not able to reject the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation under the
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data (Wooldridge, 2010).
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3.5
3.5.1

Empirical Results
Main Results

We first apply empirical model indicated by equation (2) to estimate the pass-through
elasticities for coal, natural gas and oil. Since the pass-through patterns of natural
gas and oil are very similar, we only show the coefficients of pass-through elasticities
for coal and natural gas.
As shown in Figure 3.3, the pass-through pattern of coal is distinct from that of
natural gas (oil). Changes in the spot market prices in natural gas (oil) quickly pass
through to delivered contract costs for power plants. The pass-through responses
occur almost entirely over the current period and the first lag month, and the sum
is approximately 0.85 (with a standard error of 0.01) based on the delta method
calculation. This means a 1% change in natural gas spot market price should lead to
an approximately 0.85% change in the contract prices paid by the power plants within
1 month. In contrast, the pass-through is much more sluggish and far less complete for
coal transactions. The pass-through from coal spot market prices to delivered receipt
costs of power plants could take as long as 12 months, given the statistically significant
coefficient at the 12th lag. Also, the pass-through is much smaller in magnitude for
coal transactions. The long-run pass-through after 12 months is only 0.11 (with a
standard error of 0.01.) This means a 1% change in coal spot market price can only
lead to an approximately 0.11% change in the contract prices received by power plants
even after 12 months. Based on the fact that on average coal contracts in the U.S.
last for approximately 2 years, we also check the empirical model in equation (2) with
24 lags specifically for coal. However, the long-run the pass-through after 24 months
only increases to 0.27 (with a standard error of 0.03).17
17

Given the fact that there is a substantial wedge between the spot prices and the power plants’
receipt prices for coal (shown in Table 3.1), we also check level specifications for empirical model
(2). Under the level specifications, the long-run pass-through after 12 and 24 lags is 0.19 (s.e.=0.03)
and 0.48 (s.e.=0.05) respectively, meaning 1 cent increase in coal spot prices leads to 0.19 cent and
0.48 cent increase in power plants’ procurement receipt prices after 12 and 24 months.
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Figure 3.3: Pass-through Elasticity

3.5.2

Variations by Regulatory Status

We further investigate the pass-through pattern between traditional regulated power
plants and divested deregulated plants.

The empirical model applied takes the

following form:
∆log(F uelP rice)fit

=α +

+

12
X

k=1
12
X

γkf · ∆log(SpotP rice)ft−k · 1[Deregulation]i

βkf

(3.3)
·

∆log(SpotP rice)ft−k

+Z ·X +

fit ,

k=1

where 1[Deregulation] is an indicator variable taking value of 1 if a plant is a
divested independent power producer. β f now measures the pass-through elasticity
of the regulated plants for fossil fuel f , γf instead measures the deviation of passthrough elasticity of the deregulated plants relative to the regulated counterparts for
fuel f . Since oil power plants are clustered in the northeastern U.S. and the vast
majority were divested Independent Power Producers, we lack adequate sample for
regulated counterparts for oil purchases. Accordingly, we focus on coal and natural
gas. Table C.1 in the Appendix shows βkf and γkf for k up to 6. The coefficients
are identified off variation in changes of spot prices within a fuel type, month of year,
and a deregulated (or regulated) power plant owning firm. Specification (1) report
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the pass-through coefficients for coal and natural gas without adding the dummy of
deregulation status. Specification (2) and (3) report the coefficients of the interaction
terms with the regulatory dummy, which indicate the deviation of pass-through for
divested plants relative to the regulated counterparts. In specification (3), we add the
owner fixed effects to allow for distinct trends of changes in fossil fuel procurement
costs at each owner firm, which potentially could be the decision maker of fuel
negotiation and contracting. Complementary to Table C.1 in the Appendix, Figure
3.4(a) and 3.4(b) plot the the mean pass-through coefficients based on specification
(3) for the regulated and deregulated power plants, associated with the correspondent
95% confident intervals, against the lag month period (up to 12) for coal and natural
gas purchases.
Based on Figure 3.4 and Table C.1, we can see that for coal transactions, there
are no distinguishable pattern of pass-through between regulated and deregulated
power plants. For deregulated plants, the receipt price of coal only responds to
market price changes after 2 months. For regulated plants, the pass-through from
the spot market price of coal to the receipt price could take up to 12 months, and
the current receipt price responds to market price changes in current, lag 3, 7 and 12
month. As for natural gas purchases, in line with previous results in Section 3.5.1,
vast majority of market price changes pass on to procurement costs within 1 month
for both regulated and deregulated plants. Moreover, comparing between deregulated
and regulated plants, one can find that the pass-through from natural gas spot market
prices to power plant receipt costs are faster within deregulated power plants. For
the current period of a given spot market price change, the pass-through coefficient
of deregulated power plants is significantly higher than that of the regulated plants
by 0.21. This indicates that given a 1% increase in the spot prices, on average the
increase of natural gas procurement prices in deregulated plants is larger by 0.21%
than that of regulated plants at the current period. This makes intuitive sense as
under deregulation, power plants are more prone to market changes such that they
suffer more from the volatility of natural gas spot prices.
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(a) Coal Transactions

(b) NG Transactions

Figure 3.4: Pass-through Elasticity: Regulated vs. Deregulated
Note: deregulated plants are defined as divested ones of the independent power producers.

3.5.3

Variations by Negative and Positive Market Price
Shocks

We then ask whether the pass-through differs given a positive market price change
versus a negative one. The empirical model applied takes the following form:
∆log(F uelP rice)fit

=α +

12
X

δkf · ∆log(SpotP rice)ft−k · 1[N egative]ft−k

k=1

+

12
X

(3.4)

βkf · ∆log(SpotP rice)ft−k + Z · X + fit ,

k=1

where 1[N egative] is an indicator variable for a decrease in the spot market price
of fuel f k month ago. β f now measures the pass-through elasticity given a market
price increase for fossil fuel f . δf instead measures the deviation of pass-through
elasticity given a market price decrease relative to an increase for fuel f . Table C.2
in the Appendix shows βkf and δkf for k up to 6. The coefficients are identified off
variation in increases (or desecrates) of spot prices within a fuel type, month of year,
and a power plant owning firm. Specification (1) report the pass-through coefficients
for coal, natural gas and oil without adding the dummy for a negative market shock.
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Specification (2) and (3) report the coefficients of the interaction with the dummy. In
specification (3), we add the owner fixed effects to allow for distinct trends of changes
in fossil fuel procurement costs at each owner firm. Complementary to Table C.2,
Figure 3.5(a)-3.5(c) plot the the mean pass-through elasticities given a positive and a
negative market price shock, associated with correspondent 95% confident intervals,
against the lag month period (up to 12) for coal, natural gas and oil.
As shown in Figure 3.5 and Table C.2, for coal purchases, there is no obvious
asymmetric pass-through pattern in response to positive or negative spot market
shocks. The responses under spot price increases and decreases at different lags
are not statistically different from each other at least within the first 10 months.
For natural gas purchases, receipt prices respond quickly (within 1 month) to both
negative and positive spot market shocks. Yet, a 1-month lag negative shock passes
on to receipt prices more than a 1-month lag positive shock (by 0.08% given a 1%
change in spot price in absolute value). For oil purchases, we focus on the current
and lag 1-month periods when majority of the pass-through responses occur. A Wald
test cannot reject (at 5% significance level) the null hypothesis that the sum of the
pass-through responses under a positive shock is statistically different from the sum
under a negative shock. Thus, we do not find asymmetric pass-through between
power plants’ procurement costs and spot prices for oil purchases.

3.5.4

Subcategories of Coal Purchases

We then focus on coal only and categorize coal purchases from three major coal
mining basins with coal production of significantly distinguishable characteristics.
We first investigate pass-through patterns of the 3 types of coal between traditional
regulated power plants and divested deregulated Independent Power Producers. Table
C.3 in the Appendix shows the deviation of pass-through elasticities for deregulated
plants relative to the regulated counterparts. Specification (1) report the pass-through
coefficients for the three types of coal without adding the dummy of deregulation
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(a) Coal Transactions

(b) NG Transactions

(c) Oil Transactions

Figure 3.5: Pass-through Elasticity: Positive vs. Negative Shocks
Note: a positive shock means an increase in the relevant spot market price.
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status. Specification (2) and (3) report the the coefficients of interaction terms with
the deregulation dummy, which indicate the deviation of pass-through for divested
deregulated plants relative to the regulated counterparts. In specification (3), we add
the owner fixed effects to allow for distinct trends of changes in fossil fuel procurement
costs at each owner firm. Figure 3.6(a)-(c) plot the mean pass-through elasticity
coefficients and corresponding 95% confidence intervals against the lag month term
(up to 12).
As for general pass-through patterns for purchases of the three types of coal, one
notable finding is that the pass-through between spot price changes and the receipt
prices of power plants for PRB coal is almost zero. The empirical results of essentially
no pass-through could be due to the fact that the vast majority of delivered receipt
price is the railway transportation cost, which is not tracked 100% accurately from
month to month in study (see Section 3.3). In contrast, for the CAPP and IL Basin
Coal purchases, the sum of pass-through responses within as short as 3 months are
approximately 0.10%, given a 1% change in market spot price.
We then move forward to the differences in pass-through for the 3 types of coal
between regulatory status. For PRB coal, there are no significant differences. For
CAPP coal, spot market prices have relative faster pass-through for regulated plants.
A spot market price change of CAPP coal takes only 1 month to affect the receipt
prices for regulated plants. This is in contrast to 10 months for deregulated plants. For
IL Basin coal, spot market prices also have relative faster pass-through for regulated
plants. A spot market price change of IL Basin coal takes only 1 month to affect the
procurement costs of regulated plants with a relatively large magnitude. This is in
contrast to 5 months for deregulated plants.
We then examine pass-through patterns of the 3 types of coal given different
directions of market price shocks. Table C.4 in the Appendix shows the deviations
of pass-through elasticities for negative shocks relative to positive ones. Figure 3.7
plots the mean pass-through elasticity coefficients and correspondent 95% confidence
intervals against the lag month terms. For CAPP transactions, the pass-through
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(a) PRB Coal Transactions

(b) CAPP Coal Transactions

(c) IL Basin Coal Transactions

Figure 3.6: Pass-through Elasticity: Regulated vs. Deregulated
Note: deregulated plants are defined as divested ones of the independent power producers.
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(a) PRB Coal Transactions

(b) CAPP Coal Transactions

(c) IL Basin Coal Transactions

Figure 3.7: Pass-through Elasticity: Positive vs. Negative Shocks
Note: a positive shock means an increase in the relevant spot market price.
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under a spot price decrease is faster given the significantly larger response coefficient
at the 1-month lag. In contrast, for PRB and Illinois Basin coal transactions, the
pass-through patterns of an increase or a decrease in spot market price do not differ
significantly from each other.

3.6

Conclusion

In this study, we seek to investigate a specific pass-through previous literature
overlooks in energy markets: the changes in fossil fuel procurement prices for the U.S.
power producers resulting from fluctuations in spot market prices. By quantitatively
measuring the pass-through between different fossil fuels, we provide evidence that
spot price changes of natural gas and oil quickly pass on to the procurement costs of
power producers, while the procurement costs of coal only respond sluggishly.
Our findings have implications for the increasingly important role of natural
gas generation in the U.S. electric power industry. First, given that the volatility
of natural gas market prices can be quickly transmitted to procurement costs of
power producers, they face increasing risks from upstream input markets and higher
difficulty to plan business and hedge against market uncertainty. Second, it also
sheds light on welfare distribution effects of dramatic fall of natural gas prices due
to technology breakthrough of hydraulic fracturing. The relative fast and complete
pass-through indicates a large part of welfare gains of cheap natural gas are able to
quickly fall on power producers and the end consumers. Third, the market trend of
more volatile electricity prices might also hurt low income households.
The results of our study also inform future studies in the electric power industry.
The adjustment lag between fossil fuel spot prices and procurement receipt prices for
power plants implies that spot prices do not always reflect the true opportunity costs
of using the fuel. It has implications on how to apply the static model of measuring
market power commonly used in the electricity market: when researchers construct
regional supply curves, it might be appropriate to use relevant spot market prices to
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calculate the marginal costs of natural-gas-fired generators. For the marginal cost
calculation of coal-fired generators, we should instead use observed coal receipt data
from the E.I.A or other sources.
We also document evidence that under deregulation, the transmission from fossil
fuel spot prices to procurement costs of power plants are faster. However, our findings
are not causal since we observe no variation in regulatory status across time in our
data. Our results are consistent with existing literature which finds that deregulated
electric utility firms bargain to pay lower costs for fuel prices in that we find differences
in pass-through between regulated and deregulated natural gas power plants.18
Our paper also indicates possible opportunities of future studies. One limitation
of our study is not being able to identify the causal impact of various potential
channels underlying the differences in pass-through under various scenarios. For the
comparison between fossil fuels, although we indicate an anecdotal story of distinct
contract terms in different fossil fuel markets, we do not specifically model how a
specific market factor contribute to the disparities. For instance, an inventory model
might be built and incorporated into empirical results. Also, for the comparison
between regulatory status, our studies suggest opportunities for future studies to
investigate specific channels behind deregulation that lead to the differences in the
pass-through pattern.

18

One possible conjecture is that faster natural gas pass-through was more profit maximizing over
our study period.

108

Bibliography

109

Aguirre, I., Cowan, S., and Vickers, J. (2010). Monopoly Price Discrimination and
Demand Curvature. American Economic Review, 100(4):1601–1615. 84
Beard, T. R., Kaserman, D. L., and Mayo, J. W. (2001). Regulation, Vertical
Integration and Sabotage. Journal of Industrial Economics, 49(3):319–33. 3, 5,
17, 50
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., and Mullainathan, S. (2004).

How Much Should We

Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
119(1):249–275. 21
Borenstein, S. and Bushnell, J. B. (1999). An empirical analysis of the potential for
market power in california’s electricity industry. Journal of Industrial Economics,
47(3):285–323. 6, 18, 49, 55, 88
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J. B., and Wolak, F. A. (2002).

Measuring market

inefficiencies in california’s restructured wholesale electricity market. American
Economic Review, 92(5):1376–1405. 2, 6, 18, 49, 52, 55, 61, 62, 64, 70, 71, 88, 90
Borenstein, S., Cameron, A. C., and Gilbert, R. (1997). Do Gasoline Prices Respond
Asymmetrically to Crude Oil Price Changes? The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
112(1):305–39. 86
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Appendix A
Appendix A discusses one potential empirical concern associated with the
exogeneity of treatment assignment in Chapter 1.
One trend that might bias the estimation is the changes in the transmission system
in each region. A better transmission system helps to mitigate regional congestion,
which theoretically leads to a more efficient allocation of production resources. If
prior to the event window, two regions witnessed different trends in construction
of transmission capacity, the empirical results of the study would be confounded.
I exploit transmission infrastructure data from NERC’s Electricity Supply and
Demand (ES&D) dataset, which provides annual total mileage information on existing
transmission lines with operating voltage of 151 kV or more since 1990 at the NERCregion level.19 Specifically, the data records the total mileage of transmission lines
for several ranges of operating voltage (KV) rating in each NERC region (and the
subregions). Based on this, I calculate the total length for SPP and SERC, weighted
by the mean operating voltage (KV) rating for the corresponding ranges.20 The
trends of total weighted existing transmission line mileage in SPP and SERC are
shown in Figure A.1. The figure shows that both regions experienced minimum
changes in transmission infrastructure prior to the treatment event window of year
2004.21 I also check NERC’s annual Long-term Reliability Assessment Reports (19952003), which provide future forecast of generation and reliability for the following 10
years based on plans submitted by power plants. According to the reports, prior to
2004 in SPP, “minimal additions of transmission facilities of regional significance
were planned”.

Only one of them was scheduled to be in service before 2004,

19

Each region in the study is also a NERC region. SERC changed its territory after NERC
reassigned its member territories in 2005. In order to handle this problem, I exclude the newly
added area of subregion “Gateway” and part of Kentucky in the “Central” subregion (which had
transmission lines predominantly at an operating voltage rating of 345 kV) in SERC.
20
For instance, a mile of transmission line in the operating voltage range of 600+ kV is normalized
as a mile, while a mile in the operating voltage range of 200-299 kV is normalized to be 250/600=0.42
mile.
21
The equivalent, yet opposite changes in the two regions in 1998 shown in Figure 12 are due to
the fact that a certain part of SPP was re-assigned to SERC when the data was collected. Thus,
the change does not imply an economically meaningful shift.
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Figure A.1: Total Weighted Mileage of Existing Transmission Lines
Note: The graph is based on NERC’s Electricity Supply and Demand (ES&D) database, which
provides annual information on existing transmission line mileage since 1990 at the NERC-region
level for different operating voltage ranges (151-199 kV, 200-299 kV, 300-399 kV, 400-599 kV and
600+ kV). I weight the mileage by the mean operating voltage (KV) rating for each range. For
instance, a mile of transmission line in the operating voltage range of 600+ kV is normalized as a
mile, while a mile in the operating voltage range of 200-299 kV is normalized to be 250/600=0.42
mile. Note that there are equivalent, yet opposite changes in the two regions in 1998. This is due
to the fact that a certain part of SPP was re-assigned to SERC when the data was collected. Thus,
the change does not imply an economically meaningful shift.

and other additions planned “primarily benefit local areas and have no significant
impact on subregional or regional transfer capacity”. All these moderate the concern
that the potential efficiency gains might be brought about by pre-existing trends of
transmission infrastructure in the control and treatment regions.
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Appendix B
Appendix B contains descriptions on data sources exploited in Chapter 2.
Calculation of unit marginal costs requires information on unit production
efficiency and generation capacity, and unit input cost. For the former two, I exploit
hourly operational data at the boiler-level22 on the following aspects: electricity
generation, fuel usage and emissions23 from EPA’s Continuous Emission Monitoring
System (CEMS) data. I use the hourly information to calculate the average “heat
rate” (i.e., fuel input required per unit of output) and emission rate (i.e., emission
emitted per unit of output) in year 2003 and 2005. As for the unit capacity, I treat
the maximum generation of each unit during 2002-2008 as the correspondent unit
capacity.
I take advantage of fuel receipt price data from FERC 423.24 The data set includes
monthly fossil-fuel receipts for utility power plants with a total capacity over 50
megawatts. Note that there might be multiple transactions of fuel purchase for a
power plant. I calculate the weighted averages of fuel cost based on the volume of
transactions for each month at a given plant. Then matching them with the unit
“heat rate” data, I compute the unit marginal fuel costs on a monthly basis. Since
the fuel receipt data is at the plant level, the implicit assumption is that units within
the same plant employ fuel with negligible cost differences for a given month. I obtain
the SO2 permit prices from the BGC Partners,25 which is a leading global brokerage
company with a variety of products under service. It calculates daily permit prices
based on private transactions made through the company. I assume that the data
reflects price variations of transactions in the entire market and the same cost burden
22

A boiler is a device that generates steam for power.
I focus on SO2 only as it is the only emission that burdens power producers in the SPP market
with environmental costs.
24
Fuel cost data for non-utilities is publicly unavailable for privacy purposes, which leads to missing
data if utility generating assets were sold to non-utility firms. However, no divestiture occurred in
the SPP market during the data window (See Cicala, 2015).
25
I am grateful to Jacob LaRiviere and J. Scott Holladay for sharing the data.
23
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of emission for all plants. I argue that this assumption is relative reasonable since
arbitrage should eliminate the price differences across regions.
I also take advantage of the hourly unit information to apply the test on firms’
generation-withholding behaviors.
In the SPP market, wholesale electricity transactions are realized through
decentralized bilateral contracts, which makes the market prices publicly unavailable.
Instead, I exploit system lambda data from FERC 714 form, which indicates the
marginal cost of hourly production within a power control area, to proximate the
actual wholesale prices in the the SPP. In a restructured market where centralized
wholesale market design is established such as that in California, the System Lambda
would simply be the market prices.26
Due to transmission constraints, electricity prices varies from location to location.
To deal with the problem, typically restructured markets use a nodal pricing system,
where each node is a point where energy is supplied, demanded, or transmitted.
Following the previously literature, I obtain a single price for the market by calculating
the load-based average of all power control areas for a given hour. I match generating
units into correspondent power control areas based on information from EPA eGrid
data. Then I aggregate hourly total fossil fuel generation in each power control area
and calculate hourly averages of system lambdas weighted by fossil-fuel generation in
each power control area, which are used as the proxies for the actual bilateral contract
electricity prices. For power control areas where system lambda is missing from the
data, I substitute it by the cost of the marginal unit (that is the most costly online)
within that area in that hour.

26

A centralized market assigns the rights to supply based on bids made by firms, aggregates the
offers to sell and buy and determines market-clearing prices.
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Appendix C
Appendix C includes tables of regression results in Chapter 3.
Table C.1 shows βkf and γkf for k up to 6 in Equation 3.3. Specification (1) report
the pass-through coefficients for coal and natural gas without adding the dummy of
deregulation status. Specification (2) and (3) report the coefficients of the interaction
terms with the regulatory dummy, which indicate the deviation of pass-through for
divested plants relative to the regulated counterparts. In specification (3), we add the
owner fixed effects to allow for distinct trends of changes in fossil fuel procurement
costs at each owner firm.
Table C.2 shows βkf and δkf for k up to 6 in Equation 3.4. Specification (1) report
the pass-through coefficients for coal, natural gas and oil without adding the dummy
for a negative market shock. Specification (2) and (3) report the coefficients of the
interaction with the dummy. In specification (3), we add the owner fixed effects to
allow for distinct trends of changes in fossil fuel procurement costs at each owner
firm.
Table C.3 shows the deviation of pass-through elasticities for deregulated plants
relative to the regulated counterparts for transactions of 3 types of coal.
Table C.4 shows the deviations of pass-through elasticities for negative shocks
relative to positive ones for transactions of 3 types of coal.
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Table C.1: Regression Results: Regulated versus Deregulated
(1)
(2)
Coal × L0
0.0235∗∗∗
0.0243∗∗∗
Coal × Dereg × L0
-0.000961
NG × L0
0.589∗∗∗
0.501∗∗∗
NG × Dereg × L0
0.195∗∗∗
Coal × L1
0.0132
0.0170
Coal × Dereg × L1
-0.0233
NG × L1
0.277∗∗∗
0.326∗∗∗
NG × Dereg × L1
-0.100∗∗∗
Coal × L2
0.0174
0.0121
Coal × Dereg × L2
0.0257
NG × L2
-0.0424∗∗∗ -0.0630∗∗∗
NG × Dereg × L2
0.0465∗∗∗
∗∗∗
Coal × L3
0.0375
0.0411∗∗∗
Coal × Dereg × L3
-0.0193
NG × L3
0.0122∗
0.0114
NG × Dereg × L3
-0.00861
Coal × L4
-0.00642
-0.00705
Coal × Dereg × L4
0.00607
NG × L4
-0.00820
0.00925
NG × Dereg × L4
-0.0399∗∗∗
Coal × L5
-0.00693
-0.00477
Coal × Dereg × L5
-0.0106
NG × L5
-0.0143∗∗
-0.00121
NG × Dereg × L5
-0.0241∗
Coal × L6
-0.00463
-0.00201
Coal × Dereg × L6
-0.0162
NG × L6
0.0236∗∗∗
0.00475
NG × Dereg × L6
0.0420∗∗∗
Observations
55756
55756
Month FE
Yes
Yes
Owner FE
No
No
Adjusted R2
0.218
0.225
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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(3)
0.0221∗∗
0.000502
0.501∗∗∗
0.195∗∗∗
0.0152
-0.0218
0.325∗∗∗
-0.0995∗∗∗
0.0109
0.0268
-0.0637∗∗∗
0.0473∗∗∗
0.0401∗∗∗
-0.0185
0.0110
-0.00794
-0.00788
0.00688
0.00893
-0.0395∗∗∗
-0.00564
-0.00967
-0.00148
-0.0238∗
-0.00265
-0.0156
0.00434
0.0423∗∗∗
55756
Yes
Yes
0.221

Table C.2: Regression Results: (+) versus (-) Shocks
(1)
Coal × L0
0.0222∗∗
Coal × Negative × L0
NG × L0
0.591∗∗∗
NG × Negative × L0
Oil × L0
0.627∗∗∗
Oil × Negative × L0
Coal × L1
0.0138
Coal × Negative × L1
NG × L1
0.279∗∗∗
NG × Negative × L1
Oil × L1
0.120∗∗∗
Oil × Negative × L1
Coal × L2
0.0189∗
Coal × Negative × L2
NG × L2
-0.0411∗∗∗
NG × Negative × L2
Oil × L2
-0.0157
Oil × Negative × L2
Coal × L3
0.0353∗∗∗
Coal × Negative × L3
NG × L3
0.0119
NG × Negative × L3
Oil × L3
0.0144
Oil × Negative × L3
Coal × L4
-0.00453
Coal × Negative × L4
NG × L4
-0.0122∗
NG × Negative × L4
Oil × L4
0.0851∗∗
Oil × Negative × L4
Coal × L5
-0.00915
Coal × Negative × L5
NG × L5
-0.0143∗∗
NG × Negative × L5
Oil × L5
-0.0428
Oil × Negative × L5
Coal × L6
-0.00277
Coal × Negative × L6
NG × L6
0.0225∗∗∗
NG × Negative × L6
Oil × L6
0.0170
Oil × Negative × L6
Observations
61598
Month FE
Yes
Owner FE
No
Adjusted R2
0.208
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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(2)
0.0407∗
-0.0788∗∗
0.580∗∗∗
0.0113
0.551∗∗∗
0.266∗
-0.00164
0.0672
0.242∗∗∗
0.0786∗∗∗
0.342∗∗∗
-0.459∗∗
0.0456∗∗
-0.0630∗
-0.0687∗∗∗
0.0589∗∗
0.0422
-0.0785
0.0144
0.0394
0.0930∗∗∗
-0.155∗∗∗
-0.135∗∗
0.212∗
-0.0170
0.0210
-0.0115
0.00872
0.0618
0.0277
-0.00274
-0.0132
-0.0240
0.0146
-0.167∗∗∗
0.162∗
0.0271
-0.0261
0.0167
0.00657
-0.0972∗
0.188∗
53091
Yes
No
0.216

(3)
0.0399∗
-0.0760∗∗
0.580∗∗∗
0.0108
0.547∗∗∗
0.277∗
-0.00388
0.0706∗
0.242∗∗∗
0.0780∗∗
0.337∗∗∗
-0.448∗∗
0.0446∗
-0.0627∗
-0.0685∗∗∗
0.0584∗
0.0380
-0.0718
0.0144
0.0391
0.0935∗∗∗
-0.156∗∗∗
-0.139∗∗
0.216∗
-0.0171
0.0212
-0.0112
0.00819
0.0557
0.0343
-0.00368
-0.0107
-0.0235
0.0134
-0.171∗∗∗
0.165∗
0.0258
-0.0249
0.0171
0.00527
-0.102∗
0.192∗
53091
Yes
Yes
0.212

Table C.3: Regression Results: Regulated versus Deregulated for Coal Purchases
(1)
PRB × L0
0.00692
PRB × Dereg × L0
CAPP × L0
0.0138
CAPP × Dereg × L0
IL × L0
-0.0274
IL × Dereg × L0
PRB × L1
0.00869
PRB × Dereg × L1
CAPP × L1
0.0612∗∗∗
CAPP × Dereg × L1
IL × L1
0.0493∗∗
IL × Dereg × L1
PRB × L2
0.0262
PRB × Dereg × L2
CAPP × L2
0.0364∗
CAPP × Dereg × L2
IL × L2
0.00440
IL × Dereg × L2
PRB × L3
0.000360
PRB × Dereg × L3
CAPP × L3
0.0164
CAPP × Dereg × L3
IL × L3
0.0793∗∗∗
IL × Dereg × L3
PRB × L4
-0.00160
PRB × Dereg × L4
CAPP × L4
-0.0256
CAPP × Dereg × L4
IL × L4
-0.0168
IL × Dereg × L4
PRB × L5
-0.0103
PRB × Dereg × L5
CAPP × L5
0.0203
CAPP × Dereg × L5
IL × L5
-0.0211
IL × Dereg × L5
PRB × L6
-0.00355
PRB × Dereg × L6
CAPP × L6
0.0176
CAPP × Dereg × L6
IL × L6
-0.0117
IL × Dereg × L6
Observations
22288
Month FE
Yes
Owner FE
No
Adjusted R2
0.014
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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(2)
0.00992
-0.0140
0.0209
-0.0404
-0.0251
-0.00194
0.0124
-0.0159
0.0536∗∗
0.0413
0.0475∗∗
0.0146
0.0224
0.0174
0.0275
0.0550
0.0146
-0.207∗∗∗
0.00461
-0.0209
0.0106
0.0327
0.0716∗∗
0.190
-0.00156
0.000661
-0.0229
-0.0198
-0.0155
-0.129
-0.0104
0.000531
0.0256
-0.0245
-0.0283
0.255∗∗∗
-0.00140
-0.0113
0.0184
-0.00350
-0.00550
-0.233∗
22288
Yes
No
0.014

(3)
0.0101
-0.0127
0.0208
-0.0406
-0.0261
-0.00375
0.0124
-0.0147
0.0532∗∗
0.0411
0.0469∗∗
0.0120
0.0223
0.0185
0.0274
0.0536
0.0143
-0.211∗∗∗
0.00450
-0.0198
0.0104
0.0330
0.0711∗∗
0.187
-0.00163
0.00199
-0.0232
-0.0195
-0.0164
-0.130
-0.0107
0.00185
0.0257
-0.0248
-0.0291
0.254∗∗∗
-0.00169
-0.0102
0.0186
-0.00330
-0.00615
-0.233∗
22288
Yes
Yes
0.008

Table C.4: Regression Results: (+) versus (-) Shocks for Coal Purchases
PRB × L0
PRB × Negative × L0
CAPP × L0
CAPP × Negative × L0
IL × L0
IL × Negative × L0
PRB × L1
PRB × Negative × L1
CAPP × L1
CAPP × Negative × L1
IL × L1
IL × Negative × L1
PRB × L2
PRB × Negative × L2
CAPP × L2
CAPP × Negative × L2
IL × L2
IL × Negative × L2
PRB × L3
PRB × Negative × L3
CAPP × L3
CAPP × Negative × L3
IL × L3
IL × Negative × L3
PRB × L4
PRB × Negative × L4
CAPP × L4
CAPP × Negative × L4
IL × L4
IL × Negative × L4
PRB × L5
PRB × Negative × L5
CAPP × L5
CAPP × Negative × L5
IL × L5
IL × Negative × L5
PRB × L6
PRB × Negative × L6
CAPP × L6
CAPP × Negative × L6
IL × L6
IL × Negative × L6
Observations
Month FE
Owner FE
Adjusted R2
∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗

(1)
0.00692
0.0138
-0.0274
0.00869
0.0612∗∗∗
0.0493∗∗
0.0262
0.0364∗
0.00440
0.000360
0.0164
0.0793∗∗∗
-0.00160
-0.0256
-0.0168
-0.0103
0.0203
-0.0211
-0.00355
0.0176
-0.0117
22288
Yes
No
0.014
p < 0.01
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(2)
0.0332
-0.0842
0.00700
-0.00664
-0.147
0.544∗
0.0472
-0.0587
-0.0122
0.184∗∗∗
0.138
-0.246
0.0102
0.0739
0.0873∗∗∗
-0.149∗∗
0.0640
-0.314
-0.0588∗
0.0784
0.0506
-0.0779
-0.0764
0.0825
-0.0499∗∗
0.104∗∗
0.0197
-0.101
0.0511
-0.178
0.0164
-0.0720
0.0103
0.0828
0.0495
-0.946
0.0121
0.0152
0.0735∗
-0.0834
-0.0640
0.482
13781
Yes
No
0.014

(3)
0.0321
-0.0846
0.0160
-0.0146
-0.151
0.527∗
0.0453
-0.0564
-0.00960
0.185∗∗∗
0.113
-0.208
0.00782
0.0777
0.0897∗∗∗
-0.147∗∗
0.0673
-0.353
-0.0608∗∗
0.0800
0.0527
-0.0763
-0.0708
0.0235
-0.0520∗∗
0.109∗∗
0.0186
-0.0985
0.0457
-0.192
0.0151
-0.0708
0.00902
0.0869
0.0483
-0.923
0.0102
0.0192
0.0723∗
-0.0857
-0.0478
0.424
13781
Yes
Yes
0.005
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